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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical work on noisy communication channels (Blume, Board and Kawamura, 2007),
non-strategic mediators (Goltsman, Ho¨rner, Pavlov and Squintani, 2009), strategic mediators
(Ivanov, 2010), and survey methods (Ljungqvist, 2003) has explored the efficiency effects of
making parts of the communication environment stochastic. It suggests that when there is
conflict between those who have and those who might benefit from information, introducing
randomness can help improve their communication.
Randomness moderates the inferences made from messages. When, for example, messages
are sometimes lost, their non-arrival cannot entirely be attributed to those who would not send
a message. Similarly, a “yes” answer is less revealing when the listener has only imperfect knowl-
edge of the question in response to which the answer is given. In both cases randomness causes
posterior beliefs of listeners and their responses to those beliefs to vary less across messages.
This makes it easier for speakers to provide some but not all of their information. In short,
randomness encourages information transmission by providing a cover.
This potential of noise providing a cover was recognized by Warner (1965), who proposed
the randomized response technique (RRT) to elicit information about sensitive issues, like sexual
behavior or drug use. In one version of RRT, a potential drug user is questioned by being asked to
provide a yes/no answer in response to either the statement “I have used illegal drugs yesterday”
or “I have not used illegal drugs yesterday.” The interviewer knows the probability with which
each question is asked, but in any given instance not the question itself. On one hand, this
provides privacy protection for the survey respondent; a “yes” is not clear-cut evidence for drug
use, even if the respondent is always truthful. On the other, it permits the interviewer to make
inferences at the population level if the privacy protection is sufficient to induce truth-telling by
respondents.1
RRT has been used to gather information about a large variety of sensitive issues, including
drug use and doping (Striegel, Ulrich, and Simon, 2010), tax evasion (Houston and Tran, 2001),
employee theft (Wimbush and Dalton, 1997), poaching (St John et al., 2012), regulatory non-
compliance (Elffers, van der Heijden, and Hezemans, 2003) and the integrity of certified public
accountants (Buchman and Tracy, 1982). Thus, at least in the domain of survey methods, there
is some faith in the theoretical prediction that introducing randomness aids communication.
Is this faith justified? The use of RRT is premised on randomization inducing truth-telling.
For this to be the case, a number of conditions have to hold jointly, not all of which have received
close scrutiny in the literature. First, it must be the case that there is at least some preference
1The second question can be replaced by an unrelated question such as “Have you ever visited a local library?”
with the innocuous question technique. Another version of the randomized response technique widely used in
the survey statistics literature (e.g., St John et al., 2012) is the forced response technique proposed by Boruch
(1971). With this approach, depending on the dice number they roll, respondents are instructed to either answer
a sensitive question or to give a prescribed response irrespective of the truth.
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for truth-telling so as to outweigh privacy concerns; second, respondents must appreciate and
process the inference-moderating effect of randomness; and third, if the game that is induced
between interviewer and respondent has multiple equilibria, then a truth-telling one must be
selected.
Thus far, efforts to answer the question of whether RRT works as predicted, rather than
examining the above conditions, have focused on two empirical validation methods, individual
validation and comparative validation. The former relies on the rare instances when there is direct
evidence on the question of interest that can be contrasted with the results from a randomized
response study. The latter compares data from randomized response studies with those from
alternative survey methods (self-administered questionnaires, telephone interviews, face-to-face
interviews, and computer-assisted interviews). Examples of comparative validation studies are
Beldt, Daniel and Garcha (1982), Wimbush and Dalton (1997), and Lensvelt-Mulders, Hox, van
der Heijden and Maas (2005). Their results suggest that RRT improves on direct questioning
according to the more-is-better criterion, where a higher population estimate of the stigmatizing
trait is interpreted as being more valid.
A third avenue for validation, through controlled laboratory experiments, has thus far been
largely unexplored. This is despite the fact that laboratory experiments have a number of advan-
tages over other validation methods. As in individual validation studies, the exact population
proportions are known; there is at least partial control over truth-telling preferences and stigma-
tization aversion; it becomes possible to study respondents’ beliefs about the inferences made
about them; and, an experiment can be designed to closely match a fully specified game that
can be analyzed completely.
Ljungqvist (1993) has treated RRT from the perspective of utility maximizing agents, but
has stopped short of a complete game-theoretic analysis, focusing instead on the conditions for
truth-telling to be incentive compatible. Following in his footsteps, in this paper, we use RRT as
a vehicle for illustrating the potential benefits of randomness on information transmission both
theoretically and experimentally. We first formally analyze RRT with a game theoretic model
and then conduct an experiment to explore whether the theoretical prediction of the model
matches the behavior of subjects in a laboratory setting.
Fully specifying a communication game helps make explicit the above mentioned conditions
for RRT to induce truth-telling. Following Ljungqvist (1993), we use a payoff function for the
respondent that trades off lying aversion against stigmatization aversion and, in line with psy-
chological game theory, makes the respondent’s payoffs directly dependent on the interviewer’s
beliefs. The game formulation draws attention to the role of prior beliefs and the updating of
those beliefs in equilibrium. It raises the issue of how much information can be transmitted
without the use of RRT, which we refer to as the deterministic response technique (DRT), and
how the informativeness of RRT equilibria compares with that of DRT equilibria. Finally, it
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brings into focus the possibility of multiple equilibria, especially of equilibria that are informative
without being truthful.2
We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium set of the proposed communication
game for all relevant configurations of lying aversion and stigmatization aversion parameters.
Importantly, the equilibrium analysis reveals that for some nontrivial parameter sets equilibrium
responses may provide useful information even without using RRT; when there are truthful
equilibria under RRT, they need not be optimal; and, when truthful RRT equilibria are not
optimal, DRT strictly dominates RRT inducing truth-telling. Essentially, when truth-telling
preferences are relatively strong in comparison to stigmatization aversion, while it is possible to
induce truth-telling via RRT, it may be counterproductive to do so.
Our experimental results show that there are some truthful responses by stigmatized types
under DRT, even for values of the lying aversion and stigmatization aversion parameters for which
theory rules out communication; the frequency of truthful responses by stigmatized types under
DRT responds positively to an induced increase in lying aversion; RRT does raise the incidence of
truthful responses by stigmatized types relative to DRT; stigmatized types are not approximately
truthful under RRT for induced preferences that admit truthful equilibria (despite the fact
that lying aversion, because of prior truth-telling preferences brought to the lab, is likely to be
stronger than what we induce with monetary incentives); and, the theoretical prediction that
the informativeness of RRT in terms of an entropy measure (“mutual information”) dominates
that of DRT is rejected by the data.
In summary, we formalize randomized response as a game of information transmission and
implement the game experimentally, thus linking the theory on randomness in information trans-
mission both with practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As in most
findings in the experimental literature on communication games, we observe over-transmission
of information (under DRT). As predicted by the theory, the frequency of truthful responses
is significantly higher under RRT. Contrary to the prediction of theory, DRT proves to have a
higher information-eliciting performance than RRT. Regarding validation of RRT, both our the-
oretical and experimental results show that a shifted distribution of responses in the direction of
increased truth-telling in line with the more-is-better criterion is no guarantee that the responses
came from truthful responding. Finally, our results suggest a cautionary note for optimal survey
design: while Ljungqvist (1993) is right to ground RRT in utility maximization/game theory,
it is important to keep in mind that the game in question has other than only truthful equilib-
2Recently and independently, John, Loewenstein, Acquisti and Vosgerau (2013) have relied in part on lab-
oratory experiments to evaluate RRT. Unlike ours, their approach is not guided by a formal model, there is
no attempt directly to control lying aversion and stigmatization aversion preferences, and the stigmatizing trait
rather than being induced and known to be known to the experimenter, as in our experiment, is observed unbe-
knownst to subjects. Their setup is closer to field experiments and more naturalistic. A key interesting finding
in their paper will also be relevant for the interpretation of our experimental results: RRT may fail to perform as
promised if using this method leads respondents who lack the stigmatizing trait to engage in protective behaviors,
avoiding responses that would jeopardize the perception of not having the trait.
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ria and that sometimes the price of inducing truthfulness – the direct informational loss from
randomization – may be too steep.
In the next section we discuss some of the related literature. Section 3 sets up and motivates
our model. In Section 4 we fully characterize the equilibrium sets of both the RRT and the DRT
versions of our model. The information-eliciting performance of RRT and DRT is compared
in Section 5. Section 6 lays out our experimental design and formulates hypotheses based on
our characterization of equilibrium sets in the theoretical model. In Section 7 we report our
experimental findings. We conclude in section 8 with a review of how the rationale for RRT
relates to the theory of information transmission through noisy channels, how this is reflected in
the model we put forward, and an assessment of our theoretical and experimental findings.
2 Related Literature
Communication through a noisy channel is an example of mediated communication (e.g., Forges,
1986; Myerson, 1986). Myerson (1991, p.285-288) was the first to emphasize that introducing
noise can improve transmission of private information. He considers a simple sender-receiver
game and shows that communication is possible when messages are sent via a carrier pigeon
that arrives only half the time, while there is no communicative equilibrium in the same game
when messages are transmitted without error. Blume at al. (2007) generalize this insight of
noise improving communication in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). For Crawford
and Sobel’s leading example, with quadratic payoff functions and a uniform type distribution,
they find that for almost all values of the sender bias there is a level of noise for which the
corresponding equilibrium in the noisy game achieves higher ex-ante welfare than that of the
most efficient equilibrium in the noise-free game.
Goltsman et al. (2009) consider general mediated communication and identify an efficiency
bound for payoffs achievable through communication equilibria. It turns out that for all values
of the sender bias this bound can be implemented in the noisy game of Blume et al. (2007),
through biased mediator (Ivanov, 2010), or through strategy correlation (Blume, 2012). The
bound can also be achieved, for a range of sender biases, through multiple rounds of simultaneous
unmediated communication (Krishna and Morgan, 2004).
RRT was first proposed by Warner (1965) to improve inference when there is a need to ask
sensitive questions that may be perceived as threatening to respondents. Since Warner (1965),
improvements have been made to enhance the method’s efficiency and reliability, and numerous
variations of RRT have been developed and applied (see Lensvelt-Mulders, Hox, van der Heijden
and Maas, 2005, for a meta-analysis of validations of RRT).3 There have also been instances
3There are also extensions of Warner’s method to deal with non-binary data (like the number of abortions)
and to infer distributions of continuous random variables (like income). See for example Warner (1971) and Poole
(1974) and the references therein.
4
in which use of RRT has resulted in counterintuitive results, which have raised questions about
the efficacy of the method. John et al. (2013) survey the literature on failures of RRT, provide
further evidence and suggest possible remedies.
The conceptual foundations of RRT have been formally investigated by Ljungqvist (1993),
who treats respondents as utility maximizing agents trading off lying aversion against stigmati-
zation aversion. From this perspective, finding the proper way of implementing RRT becomes
a mechanism design problem: the investigator pursues her objective of minimizing the bias and
variance of the estimator of the population proportion carrying the stigmatizing trait subject to
respondents’ incentive compatibility constraints that ensure that truth-telling preferences out-
weigh privacy concerns. Randomization or noise plays a similar role in Ljungqvist’s model as
in the above cited literature on noisy information transmission, the principal difference being
that in the information transmission literature noise is a property of the communication channel,
whereas in Ljungqvist’s model and in implementations of RRT, the noise generating device is
only observed by the respondent. A crucial component of making the noise matter in Ljungqvist’s
model is therefore that respondents comply with the device because of their postulated lying
aversion.
3 A Model of Survey Response
The objective of our theoretical analysis is to examine, in a simple setting amenable to ex-
perimental implementations, how equilibrium behavior restricts the information transmission
outcomes that may emerge under different survey techniques. We consider, building on the
environment in Ljungqvist (1993), a simple model with two players and two types. There is an
interviewer and a respondent. The respondent privately observes his type θ ∈ {s, t}, where s is
designated as the stigmatized type and t the regular type. The common prior is that the two
types are equally likely.4
The interviewer elicits the respondent’s private type with a question, q, which could either
be “Are you an s?” (qs) or “Are you a t?” (qt). We compare two response regimes, deterministic
response and randomized response. A general setup that encompasses both regimes has qs and
qt drawn, respectively, with commonly known probabilities ps and 1 − ps. The outcome of the
4We deliberately abstract away from some aspects of actual surveys. A survey, for example, involves more
than one respondent and has the objective to estimate the proportion of the population belonging to groups
with certain characteristics. In the future, it may be interesting to consider a model in which there is a non-
trivial population of responders, the population proportion of the trait of interest is a random variable, both
the interviewer and the responders receive private signals about the realization of that random variable, and
the interviewer’s objective is to correctly estimate the proportion of the population having the trait. For now,
focusing on one respondent and assuming a common prior, as we do, helps us highlight the incentives behind
individual response behavior and facilitates comparison with the literature on information transmission, noisy
channels and mediated communication cited above. The common prior assumption is standard in applications
of games with incomplete information; having the prior be uniform is a choice of convenience.
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draw (i.e., which question the respondent responds to) is known to the respondent but not to
the interviewer. The respondent responds to a question with r ∈ {y, n}, where the exogenous
semantics of y is “yes” and that of n “no.” The deterministic response regime corresponds to the
degenerate case in which ps ∈ {0, 1}; in the randomized response regime, ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1).5
We assume that the respondent’s incentive is shaped by two considerations: stigmatization
aversion and lying aversion. Consider a survey on tax evasion. The first piece of information that
the interviewer wants to obtain may pertain to whether the respondent has or has not evaded
tax. Given that tax evasion is typically not socially approved, a respondent who has evaded tax
may be reluctant to reveal it, for fear that it will entail stigmatization. On the other hand, given
that the respondent has self-selected into participating in the survey, it is reasonable to expect
that he is otherwise willing to cooperate with the interviewer by honestly answering questions.
More generally, people may be driven by an intrinsic aversion to lying to tell the truth, which is
documented in several experimental studies of communication games (e.g., Sa´nchez-Page´s and
Vorsatz, 2007; Gneezy, 2010).
Formally, we model stigmatization aversion as a belief-dependent preference. The respon-
dent’s payoff is a decreasing function of the interviewer’s belief, µs, that he is of the stigma-
tized type s. The designation of s and t as stigmatized type and regular type is thus chosen
with respect to the respondent’s payoff. For lying aversion, we consider the triple (θ, q, r) ∈
{s, t} × {qt, qs} × {y, n} and define a “truthful set” H = {(s, qs, y), (t, qt, y), (s, qt, n), (t, qs, n)}.
The respondent obtains a payoff gain if, for example, the event (s, qs, y) occurs in which his type
is s and he responds to “Are you an s?” with “yes.” We assume that the respondent’s payoff
function takes the following form:
U((θ, q, r), µs) = λIH (θ, q, r)− ξµs,
where λ, ξ > 0 are parameters measuring, respectively, the degrees of lying aversion and stigma-
tization aversion, and IH (θ, q, r) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if (θ, q, r) ∈H
and 0 otherwise.6 A higher value of λ means that the respondent is more lying averse, i.e., he has
a stronger preference for truth-telling. Similarly, a more stigmatization averse respondent will
have a higher ξ. Note that both s and t have the same degrees of aversions. For stigmatization,
this means that t dislikes being identified as s as much as s does. Furthermore, the two payoff
components do not interact with each other so that, for example, the respondent’s payoff gain
from honesty is independent of how certain the interviewer is about his type.
To make sure that the information transmission problem is not trivial, we further restrict the
5We rule out ps =
1
2 from consideration because it corresponds to the uninteresting case where the interviewer
obtains no information no matter how the respondent responds.
6With λ > 0, “talk is not cheap” in our model. Chen (2011) introduces exogenous preference for honesty to
a cheap talk model; Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) introduce lying costs into cheap
talk models.
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aversion parameters to satisfy 0 < λ < ξ, or λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1), so that stigmatization aversion strictly
dominates lying aversion. The lying-stigmatization aversion ratio, λ
ξ
, will serve an important role
in our equilibrium characterizations. As will become apparent below, if λ
ξ
≥ 1, full information
transmission will be feasible even in the deterministic response regime, defeating the very purpose
of considering randomized response.
We assume that the only “action” the interviewer performs in the model is to update her
beliefs, which corresponds to the situations where survey conductors obtain estimates of the pop-
ulation parameters of interests. A belief function of the interviewer is µs : {y, n} → [0, 1], which
specifies for each received response a probability that θ = s. The function will be determined as
part of an equilibrium.7
4 Equilibrium Characterization
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium), i.e., strategies are
optimal given beliefs and beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible. When a type
responds truthfully according to the exogenous semantics of y and n (e.g., s responds to qt with
n), he is said to give a truthful response. When a truthful response involves y (n), it is called
an affirmative (negative) truthful response. An equilibrium is said to be informative if both y
and n are used with positive probability in equilibrium and µs(y) 6= µs(n); if both types of the
respondent give truthful responses with probability one, the equilibrium is truthful.
We begin by establishing a property of the interviewer’s posterior beliefs in equilibrium that
will play a crucial role in the analysis of the equilibria and the information-eliciting performance
of the response regimes:
Lemma 1. On the equilibrium path of any equilibrium of the survey response model, the inter-
viewer’s belief differential after the two different responses satisfies |µs(y)− µs(n)| ≤ λξ .
This is a simple consequence of the fact that in equilibrium the “benefit”, λ, from a truthful
response must outweigh the “cost” ξ|µs(y)− µs(n)|.
7Alternatively, one could make the respondent’s payoff a function of his belief about the belief of the in-
terviewer, e.g. the expected belief of the interviewer. Our modeling choice is guided by simplicity, conformity
with our experimental design, and the observation that in our setting in equilibrium the distinction between the
interviewer’s belief and the respondent’s expectation of that belief disappears. For a discussion of possible mod-
eling choices in psychological games (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1989), see Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009). Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) consider a cheap-talk game in which a sender cares about his reputation,
modeled as the discrepancy between the receiver’s belief about the state and the actual state. In our model, the
respondent’s (sender) payoff depends on how likely the interviewer believes the state to be s. See also Bernheim
(1994) for a model of conformity in which agents’ esteem, derived from the opinion of others as in our case, is
modeled via belief-dependent preferences.
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4.1 Deterministic Response
In the deterministic response regime, we have a degenerate ps ∈ {0, 1}, and thus it is common
knowledge which question is asked. A behavior strategy of the respondent, σ : {s, t} → ∆{y, n},
specifies for each θ the distribution of responses to the commonly known question, qs or qt.
For the sake of concreteness and without loss of generality, in characterizing the equilibria of
the deterministic response regime, we consider that “Are you a t?” is the question asked:
Proposition 1. In the deterministic response regime in which q = qt (ps = 0),
1. for every lying-stigmatization aversion ratio λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1), there exists a unique equilibrium;
this equilibrium is informative, with t always giving an affirmative truthful response y and
s randomizing between y and n;
2. for λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1
2
], there are exactly two equilibrium outcomes; in one both types respond with y
and in the other both respond with n; and, only the outcome where both types respond with
y survives the D1 criterion.
An obvious corollary of the proposition is that there is no truthful equilibrium in the deter-
ministic response regime in the relevant range of the lying-stigmatization aversion ratio.
Whenever µs(y) 6= µs(n), the type whose truthful response results in the lower probability
value strictly prefers to respond truthfully, for doing so brings the dual benefits of being less
stigmatized as well as avoiding lying. For an informative equilibrium with q = qt, we must
have µs(n) > µs(y) on the equilibrium path so that it is type t who strictly prefers to respond
truthfully with y and thus always does so.8 We cannot, however, also have type s always
truthfully respond, in this case with n, because then µs(n) = 1 and µs(y) = 0, violating the
restriction put on the belief differential (Lemma 1). Intuitively, whenever s is willing to respond
with n under belief profile µs(n) > µs(y), he is trading off the benefit from avoiding lying against
the benefit of being less stigmatized. Given that λ < ξ, the former can never dominate the latter
for a belief differential of one. Accordingly, the informative equilibrium can never be truthful,
which leaves the only possibility that s randomizes between y and n.
If type s randomizes, since he now sometimes responds with y the value of µs(y) increases,
narrowing the belief differential (µs(n) remains at one since it is still exclusively used by s). In
equilibrium, the randomization requires that the benefit of avoiding lying be equal to the benefit
of being less stigmatized, which happens precisely when the restriction on belief differential binds
at µs(n) − µs(y) = λξ , in which s responds with n with probability 2 − ξλ . The fact that the
probability has to be strictly positive in turn yields the restriction that λ
ξ
> 1
2
.9
8With µs(y) > µs(n), s strictly prefers to respond with n, which creates a contradiction that µs(y) = 0.
9The case for q = qs is symmetric, where in the informative equilibrium t always responds with n and s
responds with y with probability 2− ξλ , again yielding the restriction that λξ > 12 .
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For the uninformative equilibria, in which both types respond identically, the belief after
the unused response has to put sufficiently high probability on s to justify the response of the
lying type. In particular, the probability has to be at least λ
ξ
higher than 1
2
, the interviewer’s
posterior after the uninformative response. Given the upper bound of one for probabilities, this
yields the restriction that λ
ξ
≤ 1
2
. A common response of n to question qt means that type t
but not type s is lying. If s is ever willing to deviate to respond with y despite forgoing the
benefit of avoiding lying, t will have a stronger incentive to deviate due to the benefit of avoiding
lying. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome with common response n does not survive the D1
Criterion (Banks and Sobel, 1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987), which prescribes an out-of-equilibrium
belief µs(y) = 0 <
1
2
. When the common response is y, the role of t and s in the above argument
is reversed; the D1 Criterion prescribes µs(n) = 1, high enough to support y as the equilibrium
common response.
Proposition 1 gives a formal expression to the predicament that calls for the use of randomized
response technique: if the respondent is sufficiently stigmatization averse (relative to the degree
of lying aversion), no information can be transmitted when the survey question is deterministic.
4.2 Randomized Response
In the randomized response regime, when ps is non-degenerate, the question q that the respondent
answers becomes part of his private information, which now consists of two components: (θ, q).
Accordingly, a behavior strategy of the respondent is σ : {s, t} × {qs, qt} → ∆{y, n}.
The following proposition confirms the intuition for the use of the randomized response
technique: the possibility of information transmission is enhanced and for appropriate choices
of the probability ps of asking the sensitive question, qs, truthful responding is an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In the randomized response regime,
1. there exists a truthful equilibrium if and only if
ps ∈
[
ξ − λ
2ξ
, 1− ξ − λ
2ξ
]
;
2. there exists a non-truthful informative equilibrium if and only if
ps ∈
((
0,
ξ − λ
λ
]
∪
[
1− ξ − λ
λ
, 1
))⋂((
0,
1
2
)
∪
(
1
2
, 1
))
; and,
3. there exist uninformative equilibria for all ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1) if and only if λξ ∈ [0, 12 ].
Since λ < ξ, it follows that the union of the sets in the first and second parts of Proposition 2
is all of (0, 1), and therefore an immediate implication of this result is:
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Corollary 1. In the randomized response regime with λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1), there exists an informative
equilibrium for every ps ∈
(
0, 1
2
) ∪ (1
2
, 1
)
.
Figure 1 depicts the regions of the parameter space in which informative equilibria exist in
the randomized response regime.10 An example of non-truthful informative equilibria has s and
t always respond truthfully to a question, different for each of them, and completely randomize
between y and n to the respective other questions.
(a) Truthful Equilibria (b) Non-Truthful Informative Equilibria (c) All Informative Equilibria
Figure 1: Existence of Informative Equilibria for (ps,
λ
ξ
) ∈ (0, 1
2
) ∪ (1
2
, 1)× (0, 1)
Similar to the deterministic response regime, lying aversion (λ > 0) is a necessary condition
for the existence of informative equilibria. In addition to the change that truthful responding
can be sustained in equilibrium, another significant difference of randomized response is that
information can now be transmitted for all λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1). The interviewer’s uncertainty about which
question is asked alleviates the negative impact of stigmatization aversion, making information
transmission possible even when ξ is arbitrarily large. However, the benefit does not come with-
out cost, because the very same uncertainty decreases the amount of information transmitted.
Despite supporting the intuition that RRT sometimes enables truthful responding, the fully
game-theoretic analysis that is summarized in Proposition 2 also hints at a possible problem
with comparative validations of the randomized response method that has thus far eluded the
literature: satisfaction of the more-is-better criterion could simply be an indicator of a non-
truthful informative equilibrium if ps 6∈
[
ξ−λ
2ξ
, 1− ξ−λ
2ξ
]
. A researcher who does not know the
value of λ
ξ
and who relies on the more-is-better criterion to validate the procedure might there-
fore mistakenly assume that respondents tell the truth, when in fact there is some degree of
randomization.
A further potential issue for using the procedure in practice is that even if ps ∈
[
ξ−λ
2ξ
, 1− ξ−λ
2ξ
]
,
truthful equilibria may coexist with other informative equilibria. According to Proposition 2,
10The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Appendix A contain complete characterizations of the sets of equilibria
in both response regimes.
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this will be the case whenever ps ∈ [ ξ−λ2ξ , ξ−λλ ]∪ [1− ξ−λλ , 1− ξ−λ2ξ ]. Thus, even for values of ps for
which truthful responding is an equilibrium, having the more-is-better criterion satisfied is not
necessarily an indicator of respondents acting according to a truthful equilibrium.
5 Information-Eliciting Performance
In this section, we evaluate the information-eliciting performance of the two different response
regimes. Using the criterion of mutual information from information theory (Shannon, 1948),
we measure the maximal transmittable information from the respondent to the interviewer that
is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
We begin with a brief discussion of the nature and properties of mutual information in the
context of our environment. Suppose Pr(θ′) > 0 is the prior of the respondent’s type θ′ and
Pr(θ′|r′) is the posterior upon observation of response r′. When r′ is observed at θ′, there is an
informational gain if Pr(θ′|r′) > Pr(θ′) or Pr(θ′|r′)
Pr(θ′) > 1. Similarly, an informational loss occurs
at θ′ if Pr(θ
′|r′)
Pr(θ′) < 1. One can assign numerical values v
(
P (θ′|r′)
P (θ′)
)
to the informational gains
and losses by introducing a function v : R → R that is strictly monotonic, continuous and
satisfies v(1) = 0. One such function is the logarithm. Using log(·) for v(·), the expected net
informational gain about the random variable θ due to the observation of the random variable
r is thus
I(θ; r) =
∑
(θ′,r′)∈{s,t}×{y,n}
P (θ′, r′) log
P (θ′|r′)
P (θ′)
,
which is precisely the definition of mutual information, where by continuity the convention of
0 log 0 is adopted. Note that the above expression can be rewritten as I(θ; r) = H(θ)−H(θ|r),
where H(θ) = −∑θ′∈{s,t} Pr(θ′) log Pr(θ′) is the entropy of the respondent’s type and H(θ|r) =
−∑r′∈{y,n} Pr(r′)∑θ′∈{s,t} Pr(θ′|r′) log Pr(θ′|r′) is the conditional entropy of the respondent’s
type given r. Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable. Mutual information
therefore measures, quite intuitively, the reduction in the uncertainty of θ due to the observation
of r.11 It serves as our criterion to evaluate the information-elicitation performance of the
two response regimes: the higher the mutual information, i.e., the higher the reduction in the
uncertainty, the higher the performance, with a maximum value of 1 and a minimum of 0.12
11Mutual information is also referred to as relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence, one between the
joint and product distributions of the random variables in question. If the base of the logarithm is 2, which
is commonly adopted in information theory, then the unit of the entropy is in bits; if the base is e, the unit
is in nats. Given that our model has a binary type space, we use 2 as our base. For an excellent reference in
information theory, see Cover and Thomas (1991).
12Given that in our model no payoff function is specified for the interviewer, there is no obvious candidate
for defining a value of information that would be less arbitrary than using mutual information. Also, pursuing
the goal of maximizing the precision of the estimator of the population frequency of stigmatization subject
to a truth-telling constraint, as in Ljungqvist (1993), is compromised by the presence of multiple equilibria.
This, and the fact that mutual information is widely used in information theory, motivate us to adopt it as our
11
Note that Pr(θ′|r′) is nothing but the interviewer’s posterior beliefs, which, together with
Pr(r′), are determined by the respondent’s strategy and, in the case of randomized response,
the probabilities of the questions. We evaluate the mutual information implied by the respon-
dent’s equilibrium strategies. In light of the multiple equilibria, we focus on the question: for
a given lying-stigmatization aversion ratio λ
ξ
, what is the mutual information of the respective
most informative equilibria in the two responses regimes, with “informativeness” evaluated with
respect to mutual information? We denote such maximal mutual information by I¯D(
λ
ξ
) for the
deterministic response regime and I¯R(
λ
ξ
) for the randomized response regime.
Recall that in the deterministic response regime, the uninformative and the informative
equilibria exist under complementary ranges of λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1) divided by 1
2
. Accordingly, we have
the following evaluation:
Proposition 3. In the deterministic response regime, the maximal mutual information allowed
by any equilibrium is
I¯D(
λ
ξ
) =
0, if λξ ∈ (0, 12 ],1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1− λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
], if λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1).
Given our specification that s and t are equally likely, the entropy of θ is 1, which is the
maximum entropy possible. The uncertainty that remains for the interviewer in the informative
equilibrium is therefore −1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1− λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
] ∈ (0, 1).
With the continuum of informative equilibria, the determination of the maximal performance
is less straightforward for the randomized response regime. To facilitate the exposition, we start
with the following lemma:
Lemma 2. In the randomized response regime,
1. for λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1) and probability of qs set at ps =
ξ−λ
λ
or ps = 1 − ξ−λλ , there exist equilibria
whose mutual information coincides with I¯D(
λ
ξ
); and,
2. for λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1), the maximal mutual information among the truthful equilibria is I¯R−T (λξ ) =
1
2
[(1− λ
ξ
) log(1− λ
ξ
) + (1 + λ
ξ
) log(1 + λ
ξ
)], achieved at ps =
ξ−λ
2ξ
or ps = 1− ξ−λ2ξ .
Furthermore, there exists a c ≈ 0.743 such that I¯R−T (λξ ) > I¯D(λξ ) for λξ ∈ (0, c) and I¯R−T (λξ ) ≤
I¯D(
λ
ξ
) for λ
ξ
∈ [c, 1) with strict inequality except at λ
ξ
= c.
measure of informational gain. Jose, Nau and Winkler (2008) investigate how entropy measures of information
relate to utility. Kelly (1956) links information-theoretic measures with the value of information in the case
of a gambler who receives information through a noisy channel. Donaldson-Matasci, Bergstrom and Lachmann
(2010) identify uncertain environments in which the biological fitness value of information corresponds exactly to
mutual information and show more generally that mutual information is an upper bound on the fitness value of
information. Information-theoretic measures of information have recently been used in macroeconomics to study
the consequences of information processing constraints (Sims, 2003), and in organization theory to capture the
idea that organizations have limited communication capacity (Dessein, Galeotti and Santos, 2013).
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In the deterministic response regime, the mutual information is determined by the respon-
dent’s strategy, which, in the informative equilibrium with q = qt, consists of truthful response
by type t, σ(y|t) = 1, and randomization by type s, σ(n|s) = 2 − ξ
λ
. In the randomized
response regime, the probabilities of the questions also contribute to determining the mutual
information. This suggests the possibility that the non-degenerate question probabilities may
serve as an exogenous randomization to mimic the equilibrium randomization in the deter-
ministic response regime, resulting in the same set of response probabilities and posteriors
that enter into the computation of mutual information. The first part of Lemma 2 says that
this is indeed the case. The analysis boils to finding ps, σ(y|t, qs), σ(y|t, qs), σ(n|s, qs), and
σ(n|s, qt) in the randomized response regime so that psσ(y|t, qs) + (1 − p)σ(y|t, qt) = 1 and
psσ(n|s, qs) + (1− p)σ(n|s, qt) = 2− ξλ . These conditions are satisfied by ps = ξ−λλ coupled with
the strategy σ(y|t, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(n|s, qt) = 1 and σ(n|s, qs) = 0 which form an equilibrium
in the randomized response regime if and only if ps is at that exact value. The two equilibria in
the two different response regimes result in the same posteriors; this is no coincidence because
the incentive conditions behind one equilibrium carry over to the other.
The intuition behind the second part of Lemma 2 can be easily seen from the fact that when
ps =
1
2
, the uninteresting case which we ruled out by definition, no information is transmitted
regardless of how the respondent responds; the interviewer’s posteriors will remain at 1
2
. More
information is transmitted, and thus the mutual information is higher, when ps moves away from
1
2
. Given the constraint that the truthful equilibria can be supported only for ps ∈ [ ξ−λ2ξ , 1− ξ−λ2ξ ],
the maximal mutual information of this class of equilibria is achieved when ps is at the boundaries
of the interval.
We proceed to characterize the maximal mutual information under the randomized response
regime, covering all equilibria:
Proposition 4. In the randomized response regime, the maximal mutual information allowed
by any equilibrium is
I¯R(
λ
ξ
) =
12 [(1− λξ ) log(1− λξ ) + (1 + λξ ) log(1 + λξ )], if λξ ∈ (0, c),1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1− λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
], if λ
ξ
∈ [c, 1),
where c ≈ 0.743.
The essence behind Proposition 4 is that the two values of mutual information in Lemma 2
form an upper envelope of the mutual information of all equilibria in the randomized response
regime. The following corollary, which compares the maximal information-eliciting performance
of the two response regimes, is immediate:
Corollary 2. For given λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1), the maximal mutual information under the randomized
response regime weakly dominates that under the deterministic response regime, with strict dom-
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inance for λ
ξ
∈ (0, c), where c ≈ 0.743.
Figure 2 provides a visualization of the comparison.
Figure 2: Maximal Mutual Information
6 Experimental Implementation
We experimentally implement the two response regimes, using monetary incentives to induce
laboratory environments that are faithful to the theoretical model. We begin by describing
our experimental treatments and hypotheses in Section 6.1, discussing the rationales behind
the adoption of the model parameters for the treatments. We then describe in Section 6.2 the
laboratory environments with which these treatments were conducted.
6.1 Treatments and Hypotheses
Propositions 1–4 serve as the guide for our treatment design, with the lying-stigmatization
aversion ratio (λ
ξ
) and the probability of “Are you an s?” (ps) being the treatment variables.
The objective of our experimental investigation is to explore if behavior in the laboratory is
consistent with the different behavior predicted under different response regimes. To this end,
14
we select parameter values that lead to pronounced behavior differences across the two response
regimes according to the theory.
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
ps = Prob(qs) = 0 ps = Prob(qs) = 0.4
λ
ξ =
1
4 DeterLow : Deterministic Response/
Low Relative Stigmatization Aversion
(Equilibrium Prediction: No Informative
Equilibrium)
RandomLow : Randomized Response/
Low Relative Stigmatization Aversion
(Equilibrium Prediction: Truthful Equi-
librium Exists)
λ
ξ =
1
8 DeterHigh: Deterministic Response/
High Relative Stigmatization Aversion
(Equilibrium Prediction: No Informative
Equilibrium)
RandomHigh: Randomized Response/
High Relative Stigmatization Aversion
(Equilibrium Prediction: Informative But
Not Truthful Equilibria Exist)
Table 1 presents our treatments; it describes a 2 × 2 design, where the rows of the matrix
correspond to the values of λ
ξ
∈ {1
4
, 1
8
} and the columns to the values of ps ∈ {0, 0.4}. The value
λ
ξ
= 1
4
represents low relative stigmatization aversion and λ
ξ
= 1
8
high relative stigmatization
aversion. The value ps = 0 corresponds to an instance of the deterministic response regime and
ps = 0.4 to an instance of the randomized response regime.
With these parameter values, there will be no information transmission in the deterministic
response treatments, and in the randomized response treatments truthfulness of the respondent
is possible only with λ
ξ
= 1
4
, i.e., when the relative stigmatization aversion is low.
In the deterministic response treatments, DeterLow and DeterHigh, “Are you a t?” is always
asked (ps = 0). The consideration of pronounced behavior differences leads to our choices of
1
4
and 1
8
for λ
ξ
; for these values we expect treatment effects when comparing the two randomized
response treatments to each other and when comparing randomized response to deterministic
response. In the randomized response treatments, RandomLow and RandomHigh, “Are you an
s?” is asked 40% of the time (ps = 0.4). Being truthful arguably represents the most distinct
behavior in the randomized response regime, and this becomes one of our criteria in choosing
the value of ps. According to Proposition 2, in RandomLow with
λ
ξ
= 1
4
there exists a truthful
equilibrium when ps ∈ [0.375, 0.625]. Furthermore, the performance of the truthful equilibrium
is at the maximal when ps is at the boundaries of the range. For convenience in implementations
while maintaining as much difference (in terms of performance) as possible from the deterministic
response treatments, we round up 0.375 and use ps = 0.4.
13 Note that non-truthful informative
13The decision to round up the lower boundary value instead of rounding down 0.625 is motivated by con-
sistency with the deterministic response treatments in which, between ps = 0 and ps = 1, the lower value is
used.
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equilibria also exist under the chosen parameters. In RandomHigh with λ
ξ
= 1
8
, the existence of
truthful equilibrium requires a different set of values of ps that does not include 0.4. However,
in order to facilitate clean comparison between the two randomized response treatments with
change in only one treatment variable, we keep ps = 0.4 for RandomHigh. Theoretically, with
λ
ξ
= 1
8
and ps = 0.4, there are non-truthful informative equilibria.
Our theoretical results also inspire our experimental hypotheses. Given the multiplicity of
equilibria, we formulate hypotheses only when definite qualitative comparisons can be backed
by the predictions of equilibrium and the D1 criterion. We begin with the behavior of the
stigmatized type in different response regimes, comparing across the columns of the treatment
matrix. The unique D1 pooling equilibria predict that in the deterministic response treatments
type s always lies. On the other hand, in the randomized response treatments equilibrium
predicts that type s either always tells the truth or does so with positive probability. This gives
us our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Stigmatized types provide truthful responses significantly more often in the ran-
domized response treatments than in the deterministic response treatments.
While the D1 equilibria also predict that in the deterministic response treatments type t
always tell the truth, no definite qualitative comparison can be made because in the randomized
response treatments the truthful/informative equilibria predict that type t either always tells
the truth or does so with positive probability less than one. We thus consider our experiments
exploratory in this regard.14
Our second hypothesis focuses on the deterministic response treatments, covering explicitly
the prediction of the D1 criterion and the effect of different levels of relative stigmatization
aversion. The latter pertains to comparison across the rows of the treatment matrix.15 The D1
pooling equilibria predict the same respondent’s behavior in DeterLow and DeterHigh, where
both s and t always respond with “yes” to “Are you a t?” This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. 1) In each of DeterLow and DeterHigh, both stigmatized types and regular types
respond with “yes” significantly more often than with “no,” and there is no significant difference
in the uses of “yes” between them. 2) The uses of responses by both stigmatized types and regular
types do not differ significantly between DeterLow and DeterHigh.
The first part of the hypothesis revolves around the predicted uses of responses under the
D1 criterion, which is implicitly used in Hypothesis 1. A hypothesis translated directly from
14Note that the randomization of the non-stigmatized type t in informative but not truthful equilibria of the
randomized response regime is consistent with the observation in John et al. (2013) that reliance on RRT may
prompt non-stigmatized types to engage in protective behaviors and thus possibly compromise the inferences
made when employing RRT.
15The multiple equilibria under the randomized response treatments do not provide definite comparisons. We
thus do not hypothesize on the comparisons between RandomLow and RandomHigh.
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the point predictions of the D1 pooling equilibria will almost surely be refuted, especially since
the predicted points are the upper and lower bounds of all possible frequencies. We thus use
a weaker hypothesis that involves qualitative comparisons consistent with the equilibrium pre-
dictions. Note that the information property of the pooling equilibria—that no information is
transmitted—is captured in the first part of Hypothesis 2. Also informed by the D1 pooling
equilibria, the second part posits that varying between the two levels of relative stigmatization
aversion has no significant impact on the behavior of both types.
We turn next to the interviewer’s beliefs. As will be discuss below, we elicit the interviewer-
subjects’ beliefs about their opponents’ types. While theory predicts that there are differences
between the interviewer’s beliefs in different treatments, the differences after different responses
are of more empirical relevance because they represent how much information is provided by the
responses as perceived by the subjects. Furthermore, these belief differences allow us to evaluate
the incentives faced by the respondent-subjects. We thus formulate our third hypothesis by
comparing, within each treatment, beliefs after “yes” and “no”:
Hypothesis 3. 1) In the deterministic response treatments, the interviewers’ elicited beliefs
assign significantly higher probability to s after “no” than after “yes,” and the beliefs after “yes”
are not significantly different from the prior 0.5. 2) In the randomized response treatments, the
interviewers’ elicited beliefs after “yes” and after “no” are significantly different.
In the deterministic response treatments, the D1 pooling equilibria predict that the belief
after “yes” is that s and t are equally likely, while the out-of-equilibrium belief after “no” has
to be sufficiently higher than 0.5 to support the equilibrium. With the anticipation that both
responses will be observed, this serves as the basis of the first part of the hypothesis. In the
randomized response treatments, a higher belief assigned to s after “yes” or after “no” are both
consistent with equilibrium. We thus do not hypothesize beyond the fact that the beliefs are
different. And which belief profile will prevail in the laboratory—a question that will be relevant
to equilibrium selection—is an empirical issue that we explore with the experiments.
Our last hypothesis pertains to the information-eliciting performance of the response regimes:
Hypothesis 4. The mutual information implied by observed behavior is significantly higher in
the randomized response treatments than in the deterministic response treatments.
The mutual information implied by our experimental data will be used to evaluate the hy-
pothesis. Note that even though theoretically the performances of the randomized response
treatments are positive but not maximal under our parameter choices, the hypothesis is still
backed by our theoretical results because with the pooling equilibria the predicted conditional
relative entropies are zero in the deterministic response treatments.
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6.2 Design and Procedures
Our experiment was conducted at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Lab. A total of
304 subjects with no prior experience in the experiments were recruited from the undergradu-
ate/graduate population of the University of Pittsburgh to participate in 16 experimental ses-
sions, four per each treatment. A between-subject design was used, and each session involved
16− 20 distinct subjects making decisions in 8− 10 groups.16 The experiment was programmed
and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
In each session, half the subjects was randomly assigned the role of Member A (respondent)
and the other half Member B (interviewer), with role assignments remaining fixed throughout
the session; they participated in 40 rounds of decisions in groups of two formed by using random
matching.17 In each group and each round, the computer randomly drew either SQUARE (s)
or TRIANGLE (t). Both members were informed about the fact that each shape would have an
equal chance to be drawn, but the selected shape would be revealed only to Member A. In the
deterministic response treatments, Member A was presented with the question “Was TRIANGLE
selected?” (qt), which was known to Member B. In the randomized response treatments, the
computer would draw a question from either “Was SQUARE selected?” (qs) or “Was TRIANGLE
selected?” Both members were informed about the fact that the former question would have a
40% chance to be drawn, but the selected question would be revealed only to Member A. In both
sets of treatments, Member A answered to the question asked, either with “yes” or “no.” The
response was revealed to Member B, who was then asked to predict the likelihood that SQUARE
or TRIANGLE was drawn. Member B was asked to allocate 100 shapes between SQUARE and
TRIANGLE, where the number of SQUARES would represent the predicted likelihood that
SQUARE was selected.
We used monetary incentives to induce lying and stigmatization aversions. Subjects were
rewarded in each round in experimental currency unit (ECU).18 If Member A’s response to
the question truthfully reported which shape was selected, he/she would receive 300 ECU in
DeterLow/RandomLow and 275 ECU in DeterHigh/RandomHigh; otherwise with untruthful
responses, he/she would receive 250 ECU. Lying aversion was thus induced as earning either 50
ECU or 25 ECU for truthful.
16We targeted at recruiting 20 subjects (10 groups) for a session and set a minimum of 16 in case of insufficient
show-ups. We met our target for 10 sessions, with the remaining six sessions four conducted with 18 subjects
and two conducted with 16 subjects.
17Before the 40 official rounds, subjects participated in 6 rounds of practice, in which they assumed the role
of Member A for three rounds and Member B for another three rounds. The objective of subjects assuming
both roles in the practice rounds was to familiarize them with the computer interface and the flow of the whole
decision process.
18We randomly selected three rounds and used the average earning in the selected rounds for real payments at
the exchange rate of 10 ECU for 1 USD. As will be discussed below, there was a rather large discrepancy of what
a Member B could earn in a round. The use of three round average was intended to smooth out the variations.
Payments to subjects ranged from, including a $5 show-up fee, $10 to $35, with an average of $29.7.
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Stigmatization aversion was induced as follows: in all treatments Member A’s ECU earned
from giving the response would be reduced by, in ECU, twice the number of SQUARES allocated
by Member B; thus, compared to the case when Member B predicted a zero probability of
SQUARE, Member A’s earning was 200 ECU lower than when Member B predicted a probability
of one. Note that in implementing different levels of relative stigmatization aversion, our design
varied the absolute level of lying aversion instead of the absolute level of stigmatization aversion:
in DeterLow and RandomLow λ
ξ
= 1
4
was implemented as 50
200
and in DeterHigh and RandomHigh
λ
ξ
= 1
8
was implemented as 25
200
.19
Member B’s rewards revolved around the provision of incentives for truthful reporting of
beliefs. We used a belief-elicitation mechanism in which, irrespective of risk attitudes, truthfully
reporting one’s beliefs is a dominant strategy (Karni, 2009).20 In the following, we describe the
essence of our reward procedure that implements the mechanism; the details of the presentation
to subjects can be found in the experimental instructions in Appendix D.
The procedure enlisted the use of two binary lotteries. We used the upper and lower bounds
of Member A’s earnings, 300 ECU and 50 ECU, as the lotteries’ monetary outcomes. After
Member B predicted the likelihood of SQUARE/TRIANGLE, he/she would be presented with a
lottery that also involved SQUARE and TRIANGLE. The probability of drawing a SQUARE in
this lottery has been randomly determined out of 100 uniform possibilities with 1
100
increments
and was revealed to Member B at this point. If the probability of drawing a SQUARE in this
lottery turned out to be higher than Member B’s predicted likelihood of SQUARE having been
selected for Member A, he/she would draw from this lottery, receiving 300 ECU for drawing
a SQUARE and 50 ECU for a TRIANGLE. Otherwise, Member B’s earning would depend on
Member A’s shape, which constituted another binary lottery: he/she would earn 300 ECU if
it was a SQUARE and 50 ECU if it was a TRIANGLE. Under this reward procedure, making
predictions according to true beliefs always guaranteed Member B a draw from one of two
lotteries where the (subjective) probability of earning the higher “prize,” 300 ECU, was higher,
thus providing the incentives for eliciting true beliefs.21
At the end of each round, we provided information feedback on which shape and, for the ran-
19This design approach was necessitated by maintaining reasonable bounds on earnings which did not differ
by too much across treatments. The base earning of 250 ECU ensured, with the induced ξ = 200, that subjects
received a minimum of 50 ECU in a round; subjects were thus guaranteed, excluding the show-up fee, a positive
payment of $5. On the other hand, the maximum ECU that a subject could earn in a round was 275 − 300;
subjects’ pre-show-up-fee payments were thus capped by $27.5 in DeterHigh/RandomHigh and $30 in Deter-
Low/RandomLow. Had we varied the absolute level of stigmatization aversion, we would have had to adjust the
base earning upward for DeterHigh and RandomHigh resulting in a considerably higher upper bound of payments
or, with no such upward adjustment, accept the possibility of negative earnings.
20Other efforts to attenuate biases caused by risk attitudes in belief elicitation include Allen (1987), Offer-
man, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and Wakker (2009), Schlag and van der Weele (2009) and Hossain and Okui
(forthcoming).
21Using induced beliefs, Hao and Houser (2012) experimentally evaluate the mechanism in Karni (2009). The
way we presented the mechanism to the subjects was similar to theirs.
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domized response treatments, which question were selected and revealed to Member A, Member
A’s response, Member B’s prediction, and the subject’s own earning.
7 Experimental Findings
7.1 Respondents’ Responses and Interviewers’ Beliefs
Figure 3 presents the trends of truthful response frequencies. Our first result compares, across
the columns of the treatment matrix, the randomized response treatment with the deterministic
response treatment:
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Figure 3: Trends of Truthful Response Frequencies
Result 1. 1) Stigmatized types provided truthful responses decidedly more often in the random-
ized response treatments than in the deterministic response treatments. 2) Regular types provided
truthful responses more often in the deterministic response treatments than in the randomized re-
sponse treatments; the differences, while statistically significant, was of much smaller magnitudes
compared to the opposite differences of stigmatized types.
Result 1 confirms Hypothesis 1. The frequencies of truthful responses by s-types, aggregated
across the last 20 rounds of all sessions, were 37% in DeterLow and 19% in DeterHigh. The
corresponding frequencies were 89% in RandomLow and 79% in RandomHigh. Using session-level
data as independent observations, statistical tests confirm that the frequencies are significantly
higher in the randomized response treatments irrespective of the levels of relative stigmatization
aversion (p = 0.0143 for all four possible comparisons, Mann-Whitney tests).22 For t-types, the
22All aggregate data reported and used for statistical testings are from last 20 rounds. The qualitative aspects
of our findings remain unchanged if we use, for example, data from last 30 or even all 40 rounds. However, the
frequency trends, especially those for types s in the deterministic response treatments where convergence was
most conspicuous, suggest that the 20th round provides a reasonable cutoff for the settlement of behavior. Using
data from last 20 rounds thus allows us to give more weight to converged behavior. Unless otherwise indicated,
the reported p-values are from one-sided tests.
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truthful response frequencies were significantly higher in the deterministic response treatments,
but in aggregate the magnitudes of the differences were at most one third of those of s-types:
the frequencies were 98% in both DeterLow and DeterHigh, 90% in RandomLow, and 84% in
RandomHigh (p = 0.0143 for all four possible comparisons, Mann-Whitney tests).
Given that in the deterministic response treatments s’s truthful response involves “no” and
t’s truthful response involve “yes,” the frequencies reported above imply the following which
addresses the first part of Hypothesis 2:
Result 1a. 1) In DeterLow, regular types and, to a lesser degree, stigmatized types responded
with “yes” significantly more often than with “no.” In DeterHigh, both stigmatized types and
regular types responded with “yes” significantly more often than with “no.” 2) In both treatments,
regular types responded with “yes” significantly more often than did stigmatized types.
Figure 4 presents the aggregate frequencies of responses. The behavior of t-types was very
close to the point prediction of the D1 pooling equilibrium, where in both DeterLow and De-
terHigh the frequencies of “yes” were 98%. On the other hand, s-types used “yes” less often
than did t-types, rejecting the hypothesis that there is no significant difference between their
behavior (p = 0.0625 for both treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). Given that t-types al-
most always responded with “yes,” s-types’ non-negligible uses of “no” transmitted information,
contrasting the prediction of the pooling equilibrium. Over-communication, a common finding in
the experimental literature of communication games (e.g., Forsythe, Lundholm and Rietz, 1999;
Blume, Dejong, Kim and Sprinkle, 1998, 2001; Cai and Wang, 2006), was thus also observed
in our experiments.23 The qualitative prediction that “yes” is used more often than “no” by
s-types was, however, largely confirmed (p = 0.0625 for DeterHigh and p = 0.125 for DeterLow,
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).
Despite equilibrium predicting no behavior difference between DeterLow and DeterHigh, in
light of the over-communication observed, a natural question is how its extent responds to the
different incentives under alternative levels of relative stigmatization aversion. Our next result
addresses the question by comparing across the row of the treatment matrix, covering also the
randomized response treatments:
Result 2. 1) Stigmatized types provided truthful responses significantly more often in the low
relative stigmatization treatments than in the high relative stigmatization treatments. 2) To a
lesser degree, regular types provided truthful response significantly more often in RandomLow than
in RandomHigh; there was no significant difference in regular types’ truthful response frequencies
between DeterLow and DeterHigh.
23We conducted an additional session for robustness check, where the parameters were the same as DeterLow
except that ps = 1 (i.e., the deterministic question became “Are you an s?”). Compared to DeterLow with ps = 0,
a higher instance of over-communication by s-types was observed: the frequency of truthful “yes” response was
46%. There was almost no difference for t-types, where the frequency of truthful “no” response was 99%.
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Figure 4: Frequencies of Responses
For the deterministic response treatments, the second part of Hypothesis 2 is confirmed for
t-types but not for s-types: the stronger relative stigmatization aversion in DeterHigh had no
impact on t-types’ behavior (two-sided p = 1, the Mann-Whitney test), whereas s-types over-
communicated less when it was more costly to do so (p = 0.0286, Mann-Whitney test).
In the randomized response treatments, the different levels of relative stigmatization aversion
affected the truthful behavior of both s-types and t-types, with a slightly stronger effect on the
former (p = 0.0143 for s-types and p = 0.0571 for t-types, Mann-Whitney tests). Figure 4(b)
shows that the frequencies of affirmative truthful responses were largely the same in Random-
Low and RandomHigh, and the effects of stronger relative stigmatization aversion were exerted
through negative truthful responses. For the question “Are you an s?” s-types responded af-
firmatively with “yes” with frequencies 97% in RandomLow and 93% in RandomHigh; t-types
responded negatively with “no” with frequencies 78% in RandomLow and 63% in RandomHigh.24
For the question “Are you a t?” t-types responded affirmatively with “yes” with frequencies
higher than 99% in both RandomLow and RandomHigh; s-types responded negatively with
“no” with frequencies 84% in RandomLow and 67% in RandomHigh.
To explore what drove the respondents’ observed behavior, we bring the interviewers’ beliefs
24This represents the kind of protective behavior by non-stigmatized types that John et al. (2013) make
responsible for occasional non-intuitive data obtained with RRT. Since in our experiment “Are you a t?” is
the more frequently asked question, in a putative truthful equilibrium a “no” response is more jeopardizing:
“no” is the response that moves posterior beliefs in the direction of giving more weight to the stigmatized s-
type. Thus t-types (as well as s-types), all else equal, have an incentive to avoid giving “no” responses. In a
truthful equilibrium this incentive is balanced by the incentive to be truthful. As our equilibrium analysis reveals,
however, a complicating feature is that there are multiple equilibria and we therefore face an equilibrium selection
problem. It is not implausible that the balance of stigmatization and truthfulness concerns also affects equilibrium
selection; from this perspective the focal principle of privacy protection may undermine that of truthfulness and
push equilibrium behavior away from the extreme of pure truth telling. An additional contributing factor for
observing protective behaviors in the field may be heterogeneity in individual weightings of truth-telling and
stigmatization concerns. Those with stronger stigmatization concerns might be expected to engage in protective
behaviors even if others are content with being truthful.
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into the picture. The “Elicited” columns in Table 2 present the interviewers’ elicited beliefs.25
Observations from individual subjects were fairly noisy as can be seen by the high standard
deviations. We proceed to our next result, which addresses Hypothesis 3:
Table 2: Elicited and Empirical Beliefs Assigned to Type s
Response “yes” “no” “yes” “no”
Beliefs Elicited Empirical Elicited Empirical Elicited Empirical Elicited Empirical
DeterLow DeterHigh
Session 1 0.39 (0.21) 0.39 0.71 (0.25) 0.87 0.31 (0.16) 0.44 0.77 (0.15) 0.86
Session 2 0.33 (0.19) 0.39 0.87 (0.12) 1.00 0.40 (0.23) 0.42 0.69 (0.35) 0.75
Session 3 0.37 (0.31) 0.40 0.87 (0.16) 0.93 0.38 (0.14) 0.40 0.71 (0.28) 0.88
Session 4 0.43 (0.24) 0.30 0.71 (0.24) 0.96 0.37 (0.16) 0.39 0.65 (0.20) 1.00
Mean 0.38 (0.04) 0.37 0.79 (0.09) 0.94 0.36 (0.04) 0.42 0.70 (0.05) 0.87
RandomLow RandomHigh
Session 1 0.42 (0.21) 0.45 0.65 (0.16) 0.68 0.43 (0.20) 0.43 0.51 (0.19) 0.50
Session 2 0.52 (0.24) 0.37 0.63 (0.21) 0.62 0.33 (0.22) 0.52 0.67 (0.20) 0.71
Session 3 0.45 (0.26) 0.44 0.64 (0.26) 0.59 0.40 (0.13) 0.50 0.54 (0.12) 0.71
Session 4 0.48 (0.17) 0.47 0.58 (0.14) 0.54 0.33 (0.21) 0.44 0.57 (0.23) 0.54
Mean 0.46 (0.04) 0.43 0.63 (0.03) 0.61 0.37 (0.05) 0.47 0.57 (0.07) 0.61
Note: Data are from last 20 rounds of each session. For the elicited beliefs, the parentheses contain standard deviations. The
standard deviations for each session are calculated using each group in each round as an observation. Standard deviations for
treatments are calculated using each session as an observation. For the empirical beliefs, the numbers are obtained by applying
Bayes’ rule to the observed frequencies of the respondents’ types, the questions, and the respondents’ responses conditional on
types, aggregated across the last 20 rounds of each session.
Result 3. 1) In all treatments, the probabilities assigned to s according to the elicited beliefs
were significantly higher after “no” than after “yes.” 2) In the deterministic response treatments,
the probabilities assigned to s according to the elicited beliefs after “yes” were significantly below
0.5.
The interviewers’ elicited beliefs were consistent with the over-communication observed in
the deterministic response treatments. While the D1 pooling equilibrium predicts that the
interviewer believes s and t to be equally likely after receiving “yes,” the aggregate elicited
beliefs assigned to s were 0.38 in DeterLow and 0.36 in DeterHigh, significantly lower than 0.5
(p = 0.0625 for both treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). It did, however, indicate that the
interviewer-subjects believe – correctly – that their opponents were transmitting information.
The out-of-equilibrium “no” was received, on average, 19% of the time in DeterLow and 10%
of the time in DeterHigh. The corresponding elicited beliefs assigned to s were 0.79 in DeterLow
and 0.70 in DeterHigh, significantly higher than when “yes” was received (p = 0.0625 for both
treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). In fact, in DeterLow 44% of the time the elicited beliefs
were equal or larger than 0.9, while it was 31% in DeterHigh. The low but positive frequencies
observed for “no” provided a window to investigate how the interviewer-subjects assigned beliefs
25We use the 20th round as the cutoff for aggregations so as to maintain consistency with the aggregations of
respondents’ data. In most cases, the trends were stable over round.
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for events that in theory are off the equilibrium path. Although it did not require a sophisticated
reasoning to assign a higher probability to s given that the interviewer-subjects were receiving
“no” to “Are you a t?” the elicited beliefs reflected the forward-induction reasoning that s was
more likely than t to respond with “no.”
Note that with higher probabilities assigned to s after “no” than after “yes,” responding
with “yes” provided t-types with two monetary rewards, one from telling the truth and one
from inducing a lower probability assigned to s. This accounted for why t-types almost always
provided truthful responses. On the other hand, when s-types told the truth with “no,” they
were trading the truthful response reward for a higher probability assigned to s. Given the mag-
nitudes of elicited beliefs, the latter on average was sufficient to outweigh the former, suggesting
that considerations other than monetary rewards might be driving the over-communication on
the respondents’ part, depriving us of equilibrium behavior insofar as monetary incentives are
concerned.26 Prior experimental studies have documented that subjects had intrinsic preference
for honesty (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007). In our case, it is conceivable
that home-grown lying aversion was brought into the laboratory which added on to the one we
induce with monetary rewards, resulting in a lower effective level of relative stigmatization aver-
sion. Indeed, the respondents’ observed behavior resembled the informative equilibrium under
a higher lying-stigmatization aversion ratio.27
The elicited beliefs assigned to s after “no” were 0.63 in RandomLow and 0.57 in RandomHigh,
significantly higher than the beliefs after “yes,” which were 0.46 in RandomLow and 0.37 in
RandomHigh (p = 0.0625 for both treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). In all the equilibria
under the adopted parameters, the interviewer’s beliefs assigned to s were in the neighborhoods
of 0.6 after one response and 0.4 after another. Whether the higher probability occurred after
“yes” or after “no” was consistent with equilibrium. With the aid of more sophisticated reasoning
than was required in the deterministic response treatments but nothing close to a full-blown use
of Bayes’ rule, the probabilities of the questions might have provided a focal point for subjects to
form beliefs that are close to the predicted values and with the higher values assigned after “no.”
Upon receiving “yes,” if an interviewer-subject considers that the respondent is very likely telling
the truth, it is fairly straightforward to reason that with probability around 0.4 the respondent’s
type is s, because such is the probability that “Are you an s?” is asked. Similar reasoning would
26To support the uninformative equilibria, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs assigned to s were required to be
≥ 0.75 in DeterLow and ≥ 0.625 in DeterHigh.
27Risk aversion might also have played a role. To avoid additional layer of complexity to our already involved
experimental instructions, we did not use binary lotteries (Roth and Malouf, 1979; Berg, Dickhaut and O’Brien,
1986) to induce risk neutrality. The respondents were trading a certain sum from truthful responses for a risky
prospect of lower probability assigned to s. Given the high variations in elicited beliefs, risk aversion might have
favored truthful responses. Note, however, that this does not undermine the conclusion that the use of random
questions led to more truthful responses, as highly varied elicited beliefs were also observed in the randomized
response treatments; risk aversion was largely controlled for in the comparisons between the two sets of response
treatments.
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lead one to conclude that the probability of s should be around 0.6 after “no.” While there were
considerable variations in individual observations so that the aggregate numbers close to the
predicted values might not be representative, the above reasoning may have at least led subjects
to believe correctly that “no” was more likely to come from s than is “yes.”
Equilibria that are consistent with the elicited belief profiles are: a truthful equilibrium in
RandomLow ; informative equilibria in both RandomLow and RandomHigh in which the respon-
dent always gives affirmative truthful responses but randomizes between “yes” and “no” when
truthful responses are negative. The observed aggregate behavior resembled the non-truthful
informative equilibria. The frequencies of “yes” by s-types to “Are you an s?” and by t-types to
“Are you a t?” were highly consistent with the predicted affirmative truthful responses, where
in both RandomLow and RandomHigh the frequencies were close to 100%. In the cases where
truthful responses were negative, randomizations between “yes” and “no” consistent with the
informative equilibria generated predictions that are within ±5% of the observed frequencies.28
While the multiple equilibria provide large degrees of freedom for interpreting observed be-
havior, the distinctive profile of response frequencies provided evidence that subjects’ behavior
was shaped by the specific incentives behind the equilibrium constructions. The key observation
was again related to the presence and absence of tradeoff in giving truthful responses. In the
equilibria in which the interviewer’s beliefs assigned to s are higher after “no,” s and t strictly
prefer to give affirmative truthful responses: they obtain a higher payoff from being truthful,
and “yes” results in a lower probability assigned to s. When s is responding to “Are you a t?”
or t is responding to “Are you an s?” they are, however, facing a tradeoff: responding truthfully
with “no” brings a higher payoff at the expense of a higher value of the interviewer’s beliefs. In
equilibrium, either the payoff from truthful responses dominates and we have a truthful equilib-
rium, or the two balances out so that s and t are willing to randomize between “yes” and “no”
for a non-truthful informative equilibrium.
In the experiments, the respondent-subjects behaved in a manner that precisely matched
the non-truthful informative equilibrium: given the elicited beliefs, they overwhelming chose to
be truthful with affirmative responses, but when a truthful response involved “no” they were
truthful less often, which in aggregate resembled randomization between “yes” and “no.” The
elicited beliefs in turn reflected the observed behavior of the respondents, closing the loop for
equilibrium.29 Note also that when the elicited beliefs were higher after “no” than after “yes,”
respondent-subjects’ optimal choice was to give affirmative truthful responses regardless of the
level of relative stigmatization aversion. However, for negative truthful responses, a higher level
28For µs(n) > µs(y), we have that σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1, and the remaining equilibrium strategies satisfy
σ(n|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1) and σ(n|s, qt) = [
√
25 + 80σ(n|t, qs)−2σ(n|t, qs)−5]/3 ∈ (0, 1] in RandomLow and σ(n|t, qs) ∈
(0, 1] and σ(n|s, qt) = [
√
225 + 160σ(n|t, qs) − 2σ(n|t, qs) − 15]/3 ∈ (0, 1) in RandomHigh. The formulae for
equilibrium strategies can generate σ(n|s, qt) ≈ 0.89 (84% observed) and σ(n|t, qs) ≈ 0.73 (78% observed) in
RandomLow and σ(n|s, qt) ≈ 0.63 (67% observed) and σ(n|t, qs) ≈ 0.67 (63% observed) in RandomHigh.
29We explore this side of the best responses in more details in the next subsection.
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of relative stigmatization tilted the tradeoff in favor of the non-truthful “yes.” This accounted for
the observation that the lower frequencies of truthful responses in RandomHigh mainly consisted
of lower frequencies of negative truthful responses.30
7.2 Empirical Beliefs and Information-Eliciting Performance
In this subsection, we analyze the observed performance of the response regimes by computing
the mutual information implied by our data. An important component of the mutual information
are the probabilities of the respondent’s types conditional on the responses, i.e., the interviewer’s
updated beliefs. The “Empirical” columns in Table 2 presents the empirical beliefs, where we
apply Bayes’ rule to the observed frequencies of the respondents’ types, the questions, and
the respondents’ responses to obtain the conditional frequencies of types. Other than being
instrumental to the calculation of the mutual information, the empirical beliefs are of interests
on their own. They provide a summary of the respondents’ observed behavior in terms that can
be directly compared with the elicited beliefs, allowing us to systematically explore how well the
elicited beliefs reflected the respondents’ actual play.
The empirical beliefs shared the same qualitative properties with the elicited beliefs in that
the beliefs assigned to s were significantly higher after “no” than after “yes” (p = 0.0625 for
all four treatments, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests), suggesting that the respondents’ qualitative
behavior was reflected by the elicited beliefs. Quantitatively, the absence of significant differences
between the two kinds of beliefs in most cases in the randomized response treatments (two-sided
p ≥ 0.375 except for “yes” in RandomHigh in which one-sided p = 0.0625, Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests) suggests that the interviewers behaved as if they were best responding. There was
also no significant difference between the two kinds of beliefs after “yes” in DeterLow (two-
sided p = 0.875, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), indicating that in aggregate the elicited beliefs
accurately reflected the actual information contained in the response. However, in the other
cases in the deterministic response treatments, the empirical beliefs were significantly higher
than the elicited beliefs (p = 0.0625 for beliefs after “no” in DeterLow and after both responses
in DeterHigh, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). The profiles of the differences suggest that in these
cases the interviewer-subjects tended to overestimate the information contained in “yes” and
underestimated the information contained in “no”: the elicited beliefs after “yes” were farther
30To further explore if subjects were responding to the incentives resulting from the elicited belief differentials
or they simply had a stronger intrinsic preference for truthfully responding with “yes” than with “no,” we
conducted another robustness session with the same parameters as RandomHigh except that now ps = 0.6
(i.e., “Are you an s?” instead of “Are you a t?” is asked with 60% chance). Supporting our argument that
the probabilities of the questions provided a focal point for belief formation, the elicited beliefs assigned to s
were higher after “yes.” Accordingly, the incentives for the two kinds of truthful responses were reversed: strict
preference exists for negative truthful responses while there is a tradeoff for affirmative truthful responses. The
respondent-subjects responded to these different incentives. For the question “Are you an s?” s-types responded
with “yes” with frequency 44%; t-types responded with “no” with frequency 94%. For the question “Are you a
t?” t-types responded with “yes” with frequency 70%; s-types responded with “no” with frequency 94%.
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away from the prior than were the empirical beliefs, while the opposite was true for beliefs after
“no.”
The mutual information implied by our data are reported in Table 3. Our next and final
result compares the mutual information under different response regimes and different levels of
relative stigmatization aversion:
Table 3: Mutual Information
DeterLow DeterHigh
Session 1 0.134 0.055
Session 2 0.213 0.012
Session 3 0.080 0.056
Session 4 0.267 0.198
Mean 0.173 0.080
RandomLow RandomHigh
Session 1 0.038 0.002
Session 2 0.045 0.027
Session 3 0.017 0.029
Session 4 0.003 0.007
Mean 0.026 0.016
Note: The numbers are obtained by applying the formula of mu-
tual information to the empirical beliefs in Table 2 and the ob-
served frequencies (aggregated across the last 20 rounds) of the
respondents’ types and responses.
Result 4. 1) The observed mutual information was significantly higher in DeterLow than in
RandomLow. To a lesser degree, it was also significantly higher in DeterHigh than in Ran-
domHigh. 2) The observed mutual information was, also to a lesser degree, significantly higher
in DeterLow than in DeterHigh, while there was no significant difference between RandomLow
and RandomHigh.
Theory predicts that for the parameters in questions the randomized response regime per-
forms strictly better than the deterministic response regime. However, rejecting Hypothesis 4,
the deterministic response regime dominated in the laboratory due to the over-communication.
Yet, as the extent of over-communication decreased in response to higher degree of relative
stigmatization aversion, the dominance also became weaker and less significant (p = 0.0143 for
the comparison between DeterLow and RandomLow and p = 0.0571 between DeterHigh and
RandomHigh, the Mann-Whitney tests). The conclusion can also be reached by the fact that
stronger stigmatization had a negative impact on the performance of the deterministic response
regime but had no effect on the randomized response regime (one-sided p = 0.0571 for the com-
parison between DeterLow and DeterHigh and two-sided p = 0.4857 between RandomLow and
RandomHigh, Mann-Whitney tests). Despite the discrepancies between the theory and the data
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regarding their relative performance, a comparative statics prediction from the theory was recov-
ered in the laboratory: relative to the deterministic response regime, the randomized response
regime performed better when there was a stronger stigmatization involved.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
The literature on communication games suggests that injecting noise into the communication
protocol may improve information transmission.
Myerson’s (1991) messenger pigeon example nicely illustrates the underlying rationale. In a
sender-receiver game with two sender types, type 2 prefers mimicking type 1 to being identified.
As a result, there is no equilibrium in which both types truthfully send messages “I am type 1”
and “I am type 2.” If, however, communication passes through a noisy channel that sometimes
replaces the message “I am type 1” with the message “I am type 2” (in the example the message
“I am type 1” is the act of sending a messenger pigeon, and message replacement is failure of
the pigeon to arrive) then receipt of the message “I am type 2” no longer unequivocally attaches
the undesirable type 2 label to the sender, and in the example separation at the message sending
stage, or being truthful in terms of the message labels “I am type 1” and “I am type 2”, becomes
possible.
When conducting surveys about sensitive issues with a binary state space, analogous to Myer-
son’s messenger pigeon example, there are two types of respondents, one of which is stigmatized
and therefore prefers not to be identified. If the stigmatized type prefers that there remain
uncertainty about its identity to being misidentified as the non-stigmatized type, i.e., the stig-
matized type’s preference order is uncertainty  misidentification  identification – then the
payoff structure is exactly as in Myerson’s example and the same logic applies. Communication
through a noisy channel helps mask the stigma and improves the incentive for being truthful.
In the survey setting it is perhaps more plausible and therefore assumed that the stigma-
tized type’s preference is monotonic in the probability that the interviewer’s belief assigns to
the stigmatized trait, and therefore misidentification  uncertainty  identification. In that
case, some degree of lying aversion can restore the former preference order, provided the respon-
dent’s preference order satisfies uncertainty and telling the truth  misidentification and lying
 identification and telling the truth. Then a request to be truthful combined with a random
mechanism for generating and privately posing questions, as in Warner’s (1965) formulation
of the randomized response technique, generates the same incentive structure as in Myerson’s
example, with the accompanying promise that there may be a truth-telling equilibrium.
We have put forward a simple game model that lets us unpack the different components of
this narrative. In this model stigmatization aversion is counterbalanced by lying aversion, albeit
not to the degree that truth-telling becomes a dominant strategy. Truth-telling is only achieved
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if questions are randomized, and even then only for a subset of the parameter space.
The theoretical analysis of the game yields two principal novel insights: there are informative
equilibria that are not truthful, and truthful equilibria need not be the maximally informative
equilibria. The first of these observations undermines the rationale for trying to validate the
randomized response technique with studies that show that using RRT yields higher estimates of
the prevalence of stigmatized traits than other approaches. The second observation is a reminder
that sometimes the direct informational loss from randomizing questions will be too steep a price
to pay for truthfulness.
The laboratory implementation of our game on one hand confirms the theoretical prediction
that RRT has the capacity to increase the incidence of truth-telling relative to direct questioning.
At the same, we find that there are systematic deviations from truth-telling when according to
the induced parameters truth-telling is an equilibrium. This is despite the fact that there is a
body of experimental evidence suggesting that experimental subjects bring prior preferences for
truth-telling to the lab (e.g., Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Gneezy, 2010), which would only
reinforce incentives for truth-telling in our experiment. Contrary to the prediction of the theory,
we find that in the lab the informativeness of RRT falls short of that of direct questioning.
Overall, our theoretical and experimental results suggest that while the potential for injecting
noise into the communication protocol to enhance truth-telling is real, it may be difficult to utilize
this effect to achieve (approximately) complete truth-telling and to improve informativeness.
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Appendix A – Proofs
We list the following payoff profiles that will be used in the proofs.
U((s, qs, y), µs(y)) = U((t, qt, y), µs(y)) = λ− ξµs(y), (A.1)
U((s, qs, n), µs(n)) = U((t, qt, n), µs(n)) = −ξµs(n), (A.2)
U((s, qt, n), µs(n)) = U((t, qs, n), µs(n)) = λ− ξµs(n), (A.3)
U((s, qt, y), µs(y)) = U((t, qs, y), µs(y)) = −ξµs(y). (A.4)
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which |µs(y) − µs(n)| > λξ on the
equilibrium path. If µs(y)− µs(n) > λξ , then −ξµs(n) > λ− ξµs(y) and λ− ξµs(n) > −ξµs(y).
Regardless of whether it is qs or qt, (A.1)–(A.4) indicate that both s and t strictly prefer to
respond with n. This implies that µs(y) is not on the equilibrium path, a contradiction. If
µs(y) − µs(n) < −λξ , then λ − ξµs(y) > −ξµs(n) and −ξµs(y) > λ − ξµs(n). (A.1)–(A.4) then
indicate that both s and t strictly prefer to respond with y, which again leads to the contradiction
that µs(n) is not on the equilibrium path.
Proof of Proposition 1. We characterize all equilibria in the deterministic response regime
with q = qt. We first show that there exists no truthful equilibrium, which follows immediately
from Lemma 1. If in an equilibrium both s and t give truthful responses with probability
one, then |µs(y) − µs(n)| = 1. Given that λξ ∈ [0, 1), this contradicts that in any equilibrium
|µs(y)− µs(n)| ≤ λξ on the equilibrium path.
Note that in any informative equilibrium with q = qt, we must have that µs(n) > µs(y); if
µs(y) > µs(n), it follows from (A.3) and (A.4) that s strictly prefers to respond with n, which
implies that µs(n) ≥ µs(y), a contradiction. With µs(n) > µs(y), it follows from (A.1) and
(A.2) that t strictly prefers to respond with y. Thus, in any informative equilibrium, t must give
truthful response with probability one and s must randomize between y and n. The indifference
of s between y and n implies, from (A.3) and (A.4), that λ = ξ[µs(n) − µs(y)]. Given that n
is used exclusively by s, we have µs(y) = 1 − λξ , which holds if and only if σ(n|s) = 2 − ξλ .
Hence, if an informative equilibrium exists, it is unique. Since ξ > λ ≥ 0, the requirement that
σ(n|s) ∈ (0, 1) imposes the restriction that λ
ξ
> 1
2
. Thus, if λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1), one can construct an
informative equilibrium; if an informative equilibrium exists, we must have λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1).
In any uninformative equilibrium, either (a) only one response is used in equilibrium or (b)
both responses are used and µs(y) = µs(n) =
1
2
. In case (b), it requires that σ(y|s) = σ(y|t) ∈
(0, 1), i.e., both s and t are indifferent between y and n. And given that µs(y) = µs(n), they are
indifferent if and only if λ = 0. Thus, an uninformative equilibrium with σ(y|s) = σ(y|t) ∈ (0, 1)
exists if and only if λ
ξ
= 0.
Consider next case (a). Suppose both s and t respond with y with probability one so that
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µs(y) =
1
2
on the equilibrium path. For this to constitute an equilibrium, we require, from
(A.1) and (A.2), that λ ≥ ξ[1
2
− µs(n)] for t and, from (A.3) and (A.4), that ξ[µs(n) − 12 ] ≥ λ
for s, where µs(n) is an out-of-equilibrium belief. Only the second inequality binds, and thus
the out-of-equilibrium belief required to support the equilibrium is that µs(n) ≥ λξ + 12 . That
µs(n) ∈ [0, 1] imposes the restriction that λξ ≤ 12 . Suppose next that both s and t respond with n
with probability one so that µs(n) =
1
2
on the equilibrium path. By a similar argument, for this
to constitute an equilibrium, we require that the out-of-equilibrium belief µs(y) ≥ λξ + 12 , which
again imposes the restriction that λ
ξ
≤ 1
2
. Thus, if λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
], one can construct uninformative
equilibria with outcomes where either both types respond with y or both respond with n; for λ
ξ
∈
(0, 1
2
], these are the only uninformative equilibrium outcomes. Conversely, if an uninformative
equilibrium exists, we must have λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
]. This also implies that for any λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1) there is
no uninformative equilibrium and hence in that range the unique informative equilibrium is the
only equilibrium.
We next apply the D1 criterion to the two equilibrium outcomes in which only one response
is used. Let U∗(θ) be the equilibrium payoff of type-θ respondent. For the equilibrium outcome
in which both types respond with n, we have that U∗(s) = λ− ξ
2
and U∗(t) = − ξ
2
. If types s and
t deviate to y, their payoffs will be, respectively, U˜(s) = −ξµs(y) and U˜(t) = λ− ξµs(y). Note
that U˜(s)−U∗(s) ≥ 0, i.e., type s weakly prefers deviating to y, if and only if µs(y) ∈ [0, 12 − λξ ].
On the other hand, U˜(t) − U∗(t) > 0, i.e., type t strictly prefers deviating to y, if and only if
µs(y) ∈ [0, 12 + λξ ). Note that if λξ > 0, [0, 12 − λξ ] ⊂ [0, 12 + λξ ); s is deleted for y under the D1
criterion, and thus the equilibrium outcome does not survive the selection criterion if λ
ξ
> 0.
Turning to the equilibrium outcome in which both types respond with y, note that type t weakly
prefers to deviating to n if and only if µs(n) ∈ [0, 12 − λξ ] and type s strictly prefers to deviating
to n if and only if µs(n) ∈ [0, 12 + λξ ). By a similar argument, if λξ > 0, the D1 criterion deletes
t for n. The equilibrium outcome with both types responding with y can be supported by the
resulting belief that µs(n) = 1; the outcome thus survives the criterion for
λ
ξ
> 0. Finally, if
λ
ξ
= 0, the D1 criterion puts no restriction on the interviewer’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and
thus both outcomes survive the D1 criterion.
Proof of Proposition 2. We establish the result by verifying the following claim, which char-
acterizes all equilibria in the randomized response regime:
In the randomized response regime in which ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1),
1. there exist uninformative equilibria if and only if λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
]; the class of uninformative
equilibria in which all types (s, qs), (t, qt), (s, qt) and (t, qs) completely randomize between
y and n in the same manner exists if and only if λ
ξ
= 0;
2. there exists a truthful equilibrium if and only if ps ∈ [12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ ]; and,
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3. the set of non-truthful informative equilibria is completely described by the following state-
ments:
(a) there exists an informative equilibrium in which (s, qs) and (t, qt) always give a truthful
response and
i. (s, qt) always gives a truthful response and (t, qs) randomizes between y and n if
and only if 1
2
− λ
2ξ
< ps <
ξ
λ
− 1;
ii. (s, qt) randomizes between y and n and (t, qs) always gives a truthful response if
and only if ps <
1
2
− λ
2ξ
;
iii. (s, qt) randomizes between y and n and (t, qs) always gives a non-truthful response
if and only if ps <
ξ
λ
− 1 < 1;
iv. (s, qt) always give a truthful response and (t, qs) always gives a non-truthful re-
sponse if and only if ps =
ξ
λ
− 1;
v. (s, qt) and (t, qs) randomize between y and n if and only if ps <
ξ
λ
− 1;
(b) there exists an informative equilibrium in which (s, qt) and (t, qs) always give a truthful
response and
i. (s, qs) always gives a truthful response and (t, qt) randomizes between y and n if
and only if 2− ξ
λ
< ps <
1
2
+ λ
2ξ
;
ii. (s, qs) randomizes between y and n and (t, qt) always gives a truthful response if
and only if ps >
1
2
+ λ
2ξ
;
iii. (s, qs) randomizes between y and n and (t, qt) always gives a non-truthful response
if and only if ps > 2− ξλ > 0;
iv. (s, qs) always gives a truthful response and (t, qt) always gives a non-truthful re-
sponse if and only if ps = 2− ξλ ;
v. (s, qs) and (t, qt) randomize between y and n if and only if ps > 2− ξλ .
Given that the respondent has four types, (s, qs), (t, qt), (s, qt) and (t, qs) and each type can
either respond with y with probability one, respond with n with probability one, or completely
randomize between the two, there are in total 81 classes of strategy profiles as candidates for
equilibrium. We proceed by either characterizing the condition under which a class of strategy
profiles constitutes equilibria or eliminating one as equilibrium candidate, until we exhaust all
81 possibilities.
We begin with the uninformative equilibria in part 1 of the claim. In any such equilibrium,
either (a) only one response is used in equilibrium or (b) both responses are used and µs(y) =
µs(n) =
1
2
. In case (b), it requires that σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
all types are indifferent between y and n. And given that µs(y) = µs(n), they are indifferent if
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and only if λ = 0. Thus, an uninformative equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|s, qt) =
σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1) exists if and only if λξ = 0. For case (a), consider first that all types respond
with y with probability one so that µs(y) =
1
2
on the equilibrium path. For this to constitute
an equilibrium, we require, from (A.1) and (A.2), that λ ≥ ξ[1
2
− µs(n)] for (s, qs) and (t, qt)
and, from (A.3) and (A.4), that ξ[µs(n) − 12 ] ≥ λ for (s, qt) and (t, qs), where µs(n) is an out-
of-equilibrium belief. Only the second inequality binds, and thus the out-of-equilibrium belief
required to support the equilibrium is that µs(n) ≥ λξ + 12 . That µs(n) ∈ [0, 1] imposes the
restriction that λ
ξ
≤ 1
2
. Consider next that all types respond with n with probability one so that
µs(n) =
1
2
on the equilibrium path. By a similar argument, for this to constitute an equilibrium,
we require that the out-of-equilibrium belief µs(y) ≥ λξ + 12 , which again imposes the restriction
that λ
ξ
≤ 1
2
. Thus, if λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
], one can construct uninformative equilibria where either all types
respond with y or all respond with n; for λ
ξ
∈ (0, 1
2
], these are the only uninformative equilibria.
Conversely, if an uninformative equilibrium exists, we must have λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
].
We are left with 78 possibilities. We proceed to eliminate candidates for informative equi-
libria. Recall that in an informative equilibrium, y and n are used with positive probability
and µs(y) 6= µs(n). Note that whenever µs(y) 6= µs(n), at least two types strictly prefer
their truthful response that also results in lower µs. If µs(n) > µs(y), it follows from (A.1)
and (A.2) that σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1. If µs(y) > µs(n), it follows from (A.3) and (A.4)
that σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0. The condition that either σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1 or
σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0 eliminates 63 classes of strategy profiles, leaving 15 distinct possi-
bilities. Consider that µs(n) > µs(y) so that σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1. The interviewer’s beliefs
are
µs(n) =
(1− ps)(1− σ(y|s, qt))
ps(1− σ(y|t, qs)) + (1− ps)(1− σ(y|s, qt)) , (A.5)
µs(y) =
ps + (1− ps)σ(y|s, qt)
1 + psσ(y|t, qs) + (1− ps)σ(y|s, qt) . (A.6)
If σ(y|s, qt) = 1, both (s, qs) and (s, qt) respond with y with probability one, leading to the
contradiction that µs(n) = 0. Thus, two additional classes of strategy profiles, which prescribe
σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|s, qt) = 1 coupled with either σ(y|t, qs) = 0 or σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1), are
ruled out. Consider next that µs(y) > µs(n) so that σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0. The interviewer’s
beliefs are
µs(y) =
psσ(y|s, qs)
psσ(y|s, qs) + (1− ps)σ(y|t, qt) , (A.7)
µs(n) =
1− ps + ps(1− σ(y|s, qs))
1 + ps(1− σ(y|s, qs)) + (1− ps)(1− σ(y|t, qt)) . (A.8)
If σ(y|s, qs) = 0, both (s, qs) and (s, qt) respond with n with probability one, leading to the
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contradiction that µs(y) = 0. Thus, two more classes of strategy profiles, which prescribe
σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = σ(y|s, qs) = 0 coupled with either σ(y|t, qt) = 1 or σ(y|t, qt) ∈ (0, 1), are
further eliminated.
The rest of the proof verifies and characterizes the remaining 11 classes of strategy profiles
as informative equilibria. Consider first the truthful equilibrium in part 2 of the claim, in which
σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1 and σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0. The resulting interviewer’s beliefs are
µs(y) = ps and µs(n) = 1− ps. Suppose that ps < 12 . It follows from (A.1) and (A.2) that (s, qs)
and (t, qt) strictly prefer y to n. For (s, qt) and (t, qs) to weakly prefer n to y, it follows from
(A.3) and (A.4) that we require ps ≥ 12 − λ2ξ . Suppose next that ps > 12 . It follows from (A.3)
and (A.4) that (s, qt) and (t, qs) strictly prefer n to y. For (s, qs) and (t, qt) to weakly prefer y
to n, it follows from (A.1) and (A.2) that we require ps ≤ 12 + λ2ξ . Truthful equilibria thus exist
if and only if ps ∈ [12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ ].
We proceed to non-truthful informative equilibria. We divide the remaining 10 cases accord-
ing to the magnitudes of the interviewer’s beliefs. Consider first that µs(n) > µs(y). The strate-
gies σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1 are to be coupled with σ(y|s, qt) = [0, 1) and σ(y|t, qs) ∈ [0, 1],
accounting for five remaining classes of strategy profiles. All of them require, from (A.3) and
(A.4), that λ = ξ[µs(n)−µs(y)] > 0. Substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into λ = ξ[µs(n)−µs(y)] and
solving for σ(y|s, qt), we obtain
σ(y|s, qt) = ξ ±
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2ps(1− σ(y|t, qs))] + ξ2 − 2λpsσ(y|t, qs)
2λ(1− ps) .
Note that for 0 ≤ λ < ξ,√4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2ps(1− σ(y|t, qs))] + ξ2−2λpsσ(y|t, qs) ≥√(2λ− ξ)2−
2λps. Thus, we have that
ξ +
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2ps(1− σ(y|t, qs))] + ξ2 − 2λpsσ(y|t, qs)
2λ(1− ps) ≥
ξ +
√
(2λ− ξ)2 − 2λps
2λ(1− ps) .
Given that
ξ+
√
(2λ−ξ)2−2λps
2λ(1−ps) = 1 for 2λ− ξ ≥ 0 and
ξ+
√
(2λ−ξ)2−2λps
2λ(1−ps) > 1 for 2λ− ξ < 0, the above
solution for σ(y|s, qt) is not relevant (σ(y|s, qt) = 1 is ruled out above). The relevant solution is
thus
σ(y|s, qt) = ξ −
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2ps(1− σ(y|t, qs))] + ξ2 − 2λpsσ(y|t, qs)
2λ(1− ps) . (A.9)
Consider the following five cases, which correspond to part 3(a) of the claim:
1. Suppose σ(y|s, qt) = 0. For σ(y|t, qs) ≥ 0, (A.9) reduces to σ(y|t, qs) =
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2−ξ
2psλ
.
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1, σ(y|s, qt) = 0 and
σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 <
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2−ξ
2psλ
< 1 or
equivalently 1
2
− λ
2ξ
< ps <
ξ
λ
− 1.
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2. Suppose σ(y|t, qs) = 0. Solution (A.9) reduces to σ(y|s, qt) = ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) . Thus,
there exists an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1, σ(y|s, qt) ∈ (0, 1) and σ(y|t, qs) =
0 if and only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 <
ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) < 1. Note that for
0 ≤ λ < ξ and ps ∈ (0, 1), ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) is strictly decreasing in ps. Thus, we have
that
ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) <
ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
. Note that
ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
< 1 for 2λ − ξ > 0 and
ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
= 1 for 2λ− ξ ≤ 0. Thus, ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) < 1 is satisfied for all parameter
values. The remaining inequality
ξ−
√
4λ2−4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) > 0 reduces to ps <
1
2
− λ
2ξ
.
3. Suppose σ(y|t, qs) = 1. Solution (A.9) reduces to σ(y|s, qt) = ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2−2λp
2λ(1−ps) . Note that if
2λ− ξ ≤ 0, σ(y|s, qt) = 1, which is ruled out above. This implies that for σ(y|s, qt) < 1, we
must have 2λ − ξ > 0, in which case σ(y|s, qt) = 11−ps
(
ξ
λ
− 1− ps
)
. Thus, there exists an
equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 1 and σ(y|s, qt) ∈ (0, 1) if and only
if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 < 11−ps
(
ξ
λ
− 1− ps
)
< 1 or equivalently ps <
ξ
λ
− 1 < 1.
4. Suppose σ(y|s, qt) = 0 and σ(y|t, qs) = 1. Solution (A.9) reduces to ξ−
√
(2λ− ξ)2−2psλ =
0. Note that if 2λ − ξ ≤ 0, ps = 1, which violates ps < 1 for randomized response. This
implies that for the stated strategy profile to constitute an equilibrium in the randomized
response regime, we must have 2λ − ξ > 0, in which case ps = ξλ − 1. Thus, there exists
an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 1 and σ(y|s, qt) = 0 if and only if,
for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), ps = ξλ − 1.
5. It can be verified from (A.9) that σ(y|s, qt) ≥ 1 if and only if 2λ− ξ ≤ 0 and σ(y|t, qs) = 1.
Thus, if σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1), we must have σ(y|s, qt) < 1. On the other hand, σ(y|s, qt) > 0
if and only if ξ −√4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2ps(1− σ(y|t, qs))] + ξ2 − 2psλσ(y|t, qs) > 0, which can
be verified to hold for σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ps < ξλ − 1. Thus, there exists an
equilibrium with σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1, σ(y|s, qt) ∈ (0, 1) and σ(y|t, qs) ∈ (0, 1) if and
only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), ps < ξλ − 1.
Consider next that µs(y) > µs(n). The strategies σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0 are to be coupled
with σ(y|s, qs) = (0, 1] and σ(y|t, qt) ∈ [0, 1], accounting for the last five cases. All of them
require, from (A.1) and (A.2), that λ = ξ[µs(y)− µs(n)] > 0. Substituting (A.7) and (A.8) into
λ = ξ[µs(y)− µs(n)] and solving for σ(y|s, qs), we obtain
σ(y|s, qs) = −ξ ±
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2(1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] + ξ2 + 2λ[1− (1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)]
2psλ
.
Note that for 0 ≤ λ < ξ, −√4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2(1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] + ξ2 + 2λ[1− (1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] ≤
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−√(2λ− ξ)2 + 2λ. Thus, we have that
−ξ −√4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2(1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] + ξ2 + 2λ[1− (1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)]
2psλ
≤ −ξ −
√
(2λ− ξ)2 + 2λ
2psλ
.
Given that
−ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2+2λ
2psλ
= 0 for 2λ− ξ ≥ 0 and −ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2+2λ
2psλ
< 0 for 2λ− ξ < 0, the above
solution for σ(y|s, qs) is not relevant (σ(y|s, qs) = 0 is ruled out above). The relevant solution is
thus
σ(y|s, qs) = −ξ +
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2(1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] + ξ2 + 2λ[1− (1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)]
2psλ
. (A.10)
Consider the following five cases, which correspond to part 3(b) of the claim:
1. Suppose σ(y|s, qs) = 1. For σ(y|t, qt) ≤ 1, we have (A.10) reducing to σ(y|t, qt) = 1 +
ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) . Thus, there exists an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0,
σ(y|s, qs) = 1 and σ(y|t, qt) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 < 1 +
ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2λ(1−ps) < 1 or equivalently 2−
ξ
λ
< p < 1
2
+ λ
2ξ
.
2. Suppose σ(y|t, qt) = 1. Solution (A.10) reduces to σ(y|s, qs) = 1 − ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
.
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0, σ(y|t, qt) = 1 and
σ(y|s, qs) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 < 1 −
ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
< 1.
Note that for 0 ≤ λ < ξ and ps ∈ (0, 1), 1− ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
is strictly decreasing in ps.
Thus, we have that 1− ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
> 1− ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
. Note that 1− ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
> 0
for 2λ− ξ > 0 and 1− ξ−
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2λ
= 0 for 2λ− ξ ≤ 0. Thus, 1− ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
> 0
is satisfied for all parameter values. The remaining inequality 1− ξ−
√
4λ2+4λξ(1−2ps)+ξ2
2psλ
< 1
reduces to ps >
1
2
+ λ
2ξ
.
3. Suppose σ(y|t, qt) = 0. Solution (A.10) reduces to σ(y|s, qs) = 2λ−ξ+
√
(2λ−ξ)2
2psλ
. Note that if
2λ−ξ ≤ 0, σ(y|s, qs) = 0, which is ruled out above. This implies that for σ(y|s, qs) > 0, we
must have 2λ − ξ > 0, in which case σ(y|s, qs) = 2λ−ξpsλ . Thus, there exists an equilibrium
with σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0, σ(y|t, qt) = 0 and σ(y|s, qs) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if, for
ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), 0 < 2λ−ξpλ < 1 or equivalently ps > 2− ξλ > 0.
4. Suppose σ(y|s, qs) = 1 and σ(y|t, qt) = 0. Solution (A.10) reduces to 2λ−ξ+
√
(2λ− ξ)2−
2pλ = 0. Note that if 2λ− ξ ≤ 0, ps = 0, which violates ps > 0 for randomized response.
This implies that for the stated strategy profile to constitute an equilibrium in the ran-
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domized response regime, we must have 2λ− ξ > 0, in which case ps = 2− ξλ . Thus, there
exists an equilibrium with σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 0 and σ(y|s, qs) = 1 if and
only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), ps = 2− ξλ .
5. It can be verified from (A.10) that σ(y|s, qs) ≤ 0 if and only if 2λ−ξ ≤ 0 and σ(y|t, qt) = 0.
Thus, if σ(y|t, qt) ∈ (0, 1), we must have σ(y|s, qs) > 0. On the other hand, σ(y|s, qs) < 1 if
and only if 2λ(1−ps)(1−σ(y|t, qt))−ξ+
√
4λ2 − 4λξ[1− 2(1− ps)σ(y|t, qt)] + ξ2 < 0, which
can be verified to hold for σ(y|t, qt) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if ps > 2− ξλ . Thus, there exists an
equilibrium with σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 0, σ(y|s, qs) ∈ (0, 1) and σ(y|t, qt) ∈ (0, 1) if and
only if, for ps ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (12 , 1), ps > 2− ξλ .
Proof of Proposition 3. From items 3 and 4 of Proposition 1, if λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
], any equilibrium
must be uninformative. The interviewer’s posterior beliefs are the same as the prior, which
implies that H(θ|r) = H(θ) = 1, and thus I(θ; r) = 0. Note that for the equilibria with common
response, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs do not enter into the calculation because for the unused
response r′, Pr(r′) = 0.
From item 2 of Proposition 1, if λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1), in the unique equilibrium σ(y|t) = 1 and
σ(y|s) = ξ
λ
− 1, and thus Pr(y) = ξ
2λ
. Bayes’ rule implies that µs(y) = 1 − λξ and µs(n) = 1.
Accordingly, H(θ|r) = −( ξ
2λ
)[(1 − λ
ξ
) log(1 − λ
ξ
) + λ
ξ
log λ
ξ
], where 0 log 0 = 0 is used. Thus, for
the unique equilibrium under λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1), I(θ|r) = 1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1− λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
]. Note finally
that while the above argument is made assuming q = qt, the case for q = qs is symmetric.
Proof of Lemma 2. For item 1, note that from Proposition 3, we have that for λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, 1),
I¯(λ
ξ
) = 1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1 − λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
], which, with q = qt, is derived from the equilibrium in
which σ(y|t) = 1 and σ(y|s) = ξ
λ
− 1. The strategy profile implies the following components
for mutual information, µs(y) = 1 − λξ , µs(n) = 1 and Pr(y) = ξ2λ . We first show that there is
an equilibrium in the randomized response regime that has the same components. Consider the
equilibrium in which σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = 1 and σ(y|s, qt) = 0, which exists if
and only if ps =
ξ
λ
− 1 and λ
ξ
> 1
2
. It is immediate from (A.5) that µs(n) = 1, from (A.6) that
µs(y) =
ps
1+ps
= 1 − λ
ξ
, and that Pr(y) = 1
2
(1 + p) = ξ
2λ
. We show next that there is another
equilibrium in the randomized response regime that has the same components up to rotation of
the responses, and thus has the same mutual information. Consider the equilibrium in which
σ(y|s, qt) = σ(y|t, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 0 and σ(y|s, qs) = 1, which exists if and only if ps = 2 − ξλ
and λ
ξ
> 1
2
. It is immediate from (A.7) that µs(y) = 1, from (A.8) that µs(n) =
1−ps
2−ps = 1− λξ , and
that Pr(n) = 1
2
(2− ps) = ξ2λ . Thus, for λξ ∈ (12 , 1) and ps ∈ { ξλ − 1, 2− ξλ}, there exist equilibria
in the randomized response regime whose mutual information is 1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1− λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
].
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For item 2, consider the truthful equilibria in which σ(y|s, qs) = σ(y|t, qt) = 1 and σ(y|s, qt) =
σ(y|t, qs) = 0, which exist if and only if ps ∈ [12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ ]. The strategy profiles imply that
µs(y) = ps, µs(n) = 1 − ps, and Pr(y) = Pr(n) = 12 . The resulting mutual information is thus
1 + ps log ps + (1 − ps) log(1 − ps), which attains its minimum at ps = 12 and is strictly convex
in ps. This implies that for ps ∈ [12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ ], the mutual information attains maxima when
ps ∈ {12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ}. Substituting ps ∈ {12 − λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ} into 1 + ps log ps + (1− ps) log(1− ps),
we obtain I¯R−T (λξ ) =
1
2
[(1− λ
ξ
) log(1− λ
ξ
) + (1 + λ
ξ
) log(1 + λ
ξ
)].
Finally, we compare the two values of mutual information, 1
2
[(1− λ
ξ
) log(1− λ
ξ
)+(1+ λ
ξ
) log(1+
λ
ξ
)] and 1 + 1
2
[( ξ
λ
− 1) log(1 − λ
ξ
) + log λ
ξ
]. We define, subtracting the latter from the former,
∆I¯(λ
ξ
) = 1
2
[(2− λ
ξ
− ξ
λ
) log(1− λ
ξ
)+(1+ λ
ξ
) log(1+ λ
ξ
)−log λ
ξ
]−1 for λ
ξ
= [1
2
, 1], using the fact that the
expression is well-defined at the endpoints of the interval [1
2
, 1]. Note that ∆I¯(1
2
) = 3
4
log 3−1 > 0,
∆I¯(1) = 0, and
d∆I¯(λ
ξ
)
d(λ
ξ
)
=
[1−(λ
ξ
)2] ln(1−λ
ξ
)+(λ
ξ
)2 ln(1+λ
ξ
)
(λ
ξ
)2 ln 4
> 0 at λ
ξ
= 1. Hence, there exists x ∈ (0, 1
2
)
for which ∆I¯(x) < 0, and, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a c ∈ (1
2
, 1) with
∆I¯(c) = 0. Since
d2∆I¯(λ
ξ
)
d(λ
ξ
)2
= − (
λ
ξ
)(1+ 2λ
ξ
)+2(1+λ
ξ
) ln(1−λ
ξ
)
(λ
ξ
)3(1+λ
ξ
) ln 4
> 0 for λ
ξ
∈ [1
2
, 1], this c is unique. It can
be verified numerically that c ≈ 0.743.
Proof of Proposition 4. We solve a constrained maximization problem, where the objective
function is the mutual information and the constraint comes from the restriction of equilibria,
i.e., the maximal belief differential that |µs(y) − µs(n)| ≤ λξ (Lemma 1). Since our objective is
to find the maximal mutual information allowed by any equilibria in the randomized response
regime, it follows from Lemma 2 that for truthful equilibria we can focus on the cases where
ps ∈ {12− λ2ξ , 12 + λ2ξ}, which imply that |µs(y)−µs(n)| = λξ ; for the other equilibria in which at least
two types randomize between responses, the indifference also requires that |µs(y)− µs(n)| = λξ .
Accordingly, for our purpose it is without loss of generality to consider that the constraint binds.
The objective function is
I(θ; r) = 1+
[
Pr(y|s) + Pr(y|t)
2
]
(µs(y) log µs(y) + [1− µs(y)] log[1− µs(y)])
+
[
Pr(n|s) + Pr(n|t)
2
]
(µs(n) log µs(n) + [1− µs(n)] log[1− µs(n)]).
(A.11)
Note that as a function, (A.11) has six variables. We use the fact that these are probabilities to
reduce the number of variables. First of all, by Bayes’ rule, we have that
µs(y) =
Pr(y|s)
Pr(y|s) + Pr(y|t) ⇔ Pr(y|s) + Pr(y|t) =
Pr(y|s)
µs(y)
, (A.12)
µs(n) =
Pr(n|s)
Pr(n|s) + Pr(n|t) ⇔ Pr(n|s) + Pr(n|t) =
Pr(n|s)
µs(n)
. (A.13)
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Substituting (A.12) and (A.13) into (A.11), we obtain
I(θ; r) = 1+
[
Pr(y|s)
2µs(y)
]
(µs(y) log µs(y) + [1− µs(y)] log[1− µs(y)])
+
[
Pr(n|s)
2µs(n)
]
(µs(n) log µs(n) + [1− µs(n)] log[1− µs(n)])].
(A.14)
We use the fact that Pr(n|·) = 1 − Pr(y|·) to further eliminate Pr(n|s) and µs(n). Note that
(A.13) can be rewritten as
µs(n) =
1− Pr(y|s)
2− [Pr(y|s) + Pr(y|t)] =
µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s) , (A.15)
where in the second equality we use (A.12) for Pr(y|s) + Pr(y|t). Using (A.15) and the fact that
Pr(n|s)
2µs(n)
= 1− Pr(y|s)
2µs(y)
, (A.14) becomes
I(θ; r) = 1+
[
Pr(y|s)
2µs(y)
]
(µs(y) log µs(y) + [1− µs(y)] log[1− µs(y)])
+
[
1− Pr(y|s)
2µs(y)
] [(
µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s)
)
log
(
µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s)
)
+
(
1− µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s)
)
log
(
1− µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s)
)]
.
(A.16)
Finally, we eliminate Pr(y|s) by using the belief constraint. Without loss of generality, we
consider the case where µs(n) > µs(y) so that the constraint is µs(n)−µs(y) = λξ . Using (A.15),
the constraint becomes
µs(y)[1− Pr(y|s)]
2µs(y)− Pr(y|s) − µs(y) =
λ
ξ
⇔ Pr(y|s) = µs(y)
(
ξ
λ
)(
2
[
λ
ξ
+ µs(y)
]
− 1
)
. (A.17)
Substituting (A.17) into (A.16), we obtain the following function in terms of µs(y) only:
I(θ; r) =Iˆ(µs(y))
=1 +
(
1− ξ
2λ
[1− 2µs(y)]
)
(µs(y) log µs(y) + [1− µs(y)] log[1− µs(y)])
+
(
ξ
2λ
[1− 2µs(y)]
)[(
µs(y) +
λ
ξ
)
log
(
µs(y) +
λ
ξ
)
+
(
1− µs(y)− λ
ξ
)
log
(
1− µs(y)− λ
ξ
)]
.
(A.18)
Note that there are also the box constraints that µs(y) ∈ [0, 1] and µs(n) ∈ [0, 1]. And given
the belief constraint, these box constraints are satisfied if and only if µs(y) ∈ [0, 1 − λξ ]. Thus,
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our maximization problem is
Max
µs(y)∈[0,1−λξ ]
Iˆ(µs(y)).
Note that Iˆ(·) is symmetric at 1
2
(
1− λ
ξ
)
, i.e., Iˆ
(
1
2
(
1− λ
ξ
)
+ x
)
= Iˆ
(
1
2
(
1− λ
ξ
)− x).
The first-order condition for an extremum is[
1− 2λ
ξ
− 4µs(y)
]
ln
(
µs(y) +
λ
ξ
µs(y)
)
=
[
3− 2λ
ξ
− 4µs(y)
]
ln
(
1− µs(y)− λξ
1− µs(y)
)
. (A.19)
Equation (A.19) is satisfied at the point of symmetry, µs(y) =
1
2
(
1− λ
ξ
)
, which is the mid-point
of the range [0, 1− λ
ξ
]. The second derivative of Iˆ(µs(y)) is
Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) =
1−2µs(y)
2(µs(y)+
λ
ξ
)(1−µs(y)−λξ )
− 1−2[µs(y)+
λ
ξ
]
2µs(y)[1−µs(y)] − 2 ln
([
1−µs(y)
µs(y)
][
µs(y)+
λ
ξ
1−µs(y)−λξ
])
λ
ξ
ln 2
.
It can be verified that
Iˆ ′′(1
2
(1− λ
ξ
)) =
4
[
λ
ξ
(1−λ
ξ
)(1+λ
ξ
)
+ ln
(
1−λ
ξ
1+λ
ξ
)]
λ
ξ
ln 2
T 0 for λ
ξ
T d,
where d ≈ 0.796. Thus, µs(y) = 12(1− λξ ) corresponds to a local maximum for λξ < d and a local
minimum for λ
ξ
> d.
We further derive the third derivative:
Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) =
1
([µs(y)][1− µs(y)][µs(y) + λξ ][1− µs(y)− λξ ])2 ln 4
×
(
1− 2µs(y)− λ
ξ
)[
2
(
λ
ξ
)3
[1− 2µs(y)]
−3
(
λ
ξ
)2
(1− 2µs(y)[1− µs(y)])
+
(
λ
ξ
)
(1− 2µs(y)(2− µs(y)[3− 2µs(y)])
+2µs(y)[1− µs(y)](1− µs(y)[1− µs(y)])
]
.
(A.20)
We evaluate the values of the third derivative for λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1), which in turns allows us to infer the
properties of the second derivative and to establish the global maxima of the objective function.
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Solving Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) = 0 gives three real solutions:
µˆs(y) =
1
2
1− λ
ξ
−
√√√√
2
√
4
(
λ
ξ
)4
−
(
λ
ξ
)2
+ 1− 3
(
λ
ξ
)2
− 1
 , (A.21)
µ¯s(y) =
1
2
(
1− λ
ξ
)
, (A.22)
µ˜s(y) =
1
2
1− λ
ξ
+
√√√√
2
√
4
(
λ
ξ
)4
−
(
λ
ξ
)2
+ 1− 3
(
λ
ξ
)2
− 1
 . (A.23)
We first consider λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
]. Note that for λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
], µ¯s(y) =
1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
) in (A.22) is the
only point in (0, 1 − λ
ξ
) at which the third derivative vanishes. Evaluating the expression in
(A.20) for λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
] then gives that Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) T 0 for µs(y) S 12(1 − λξ ). And for λξ ∈ [0, 12 ],
limµs(y)→0 Iˆ
′′(µs(y)) = limµs(y)→(1−λξ ) Iˆ
′′(µs(y)) = −∞. Accordingly, with 12 < d, for λξ ∈ [0, 12 ],
Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) ≤ Iˆ ′′(12(1 − λξ )) < 0 for all µs(y) ∈ [0, 1 − λξ ]. Thus, Iˆ(µs(y)) is strictly concave on
[0, 1− λ
ξ
] for λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
], and µs(y) =
1
2
(1− λ
ξ
) corresponds to a global maximum for λ
ξ
∈ [0, 1
2
].
We consider next λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, 1]. Note that for λ
ξ
∈ (√3/7, 1), µ¯s(y) = 12(1− λξ ) in (A.22) is
the only point in [0, 1 − λ
ξ
] at which the third derivative vanishes. And for λ
ξ
∈ {√3/7, 1}, the
three solutions in (A.21)-(A.23) coincide. Evaluating the expression in (A.20) for λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, 1]
then gives that Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) T 0 for µs(y) T 12(1− λξ ). Accordingly, with
√
3/7 < d, for λ
ξ
∈ (d, 1],
Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) ≥ Iˆ ′′(12(1 − λξ )) > 0 for all µs(y) ∈ [0, 1 − λξ ]. Thus, Iˆ(µs(y)) is strictly convex on
[0, 1− λ
ξ
] for λ
ξ
∈ (d, 1], and the global maxima lie at, given the symmetry at 1
2
(1− λ
ξ
), the two
boundaries, µs(y) = 0 or µs(y) = 1− λξ .
We further divide the remaining case λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
, d] into two sub-cases, when λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
,
√
3/7)
and when λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, d]. We consider the latter case first. It follows from the above that
for λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, d], we have that Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) ≥ Iˆ ′′(12(1 − λξ )) for all µs(y) ∈ [0, 1 − λξ ]. Given the
symmetry of Iˆ(µs(y)), we without loss of generality focus on its behavior for µs(y) ∈ [0, 12(1− λξ )].
Note that for λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, d], limµs(y)→0 Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) =∞ and recall that for λξ ≤ d, Iˆ ′′(12(1− λξ )) ≤ 0.
Given that for λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, 1], Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) < 0 for µs(y) < 12(1 − λξ ), there exists a unique
k ∈ (0, 1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
)] such that Iˆ ′′(k) = 0. This further implies that there is at most one point in
(0, 1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
)) such that the first-order condition is satisfied, in which case it corresponds to a
local minimum; µs(y) =
1
2
(1− λ
ξ
) thus corresponds to a unique local maximum. Given that, for
λ
ξ
∈ [√3/7, d], Iˆ(µs(y)) is strictly convex for µs(y) sufficiently close to zero and concave (strictly
concave for λ
ξ
< d) in the neighborhood of 1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
), the global maximum is achieved either at
the unique local maximum at µs(y) =
1
2
(1− λ
ξ
) or at the boundary µs(y) = 0 or, by symmetry,
µs(y) = 1− λξ .
Finally, we consider λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
,
√
3/7). Note that for λ
ξ
∈ (1
2
,
√
3/7), the solution in (A.21)
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satisfies that µˆs(y) ∈ (0, 12(1−λξ )) and the solution in (A.23) satisfies that µ˜s(y) ∈ (12(1−λξ ), 1−λξ ).
Similar to the above paragraph, the following argument focuses on µs(y) ∈ [0, 12(1 − λξ )] under
the symmetry. Evaluating the expression in (A.20) gives that Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) ≤ 0 for µs(y) ≤ µˆs(y)
and Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) > 0 for µs(y) ∈ (µˆs(y), 12(1 − λξ )). Recall that for λξ in this range, we have that
Iˆ ′′(1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
)) < 0. Then, the fact that Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) > 0 for µs(y) ∈ (µˆs(y), 12(1 − λξ )) implies that
Iˆ ′′(µs(y)) < 0 for µs(y) ∈ (µˆs(y), 12(1− λξ )). Note that for λξ ∈ (12 ,
√
3/7), limµs(y)→0 Iˆ
′′(µs(y)) =
∞. Thus, given that Iˆ ′′′(µs(y)) ≤ 0 for µs(y) ≤ µˆs(y), there exists a unique v ∈ (0, µˆs(y)] such
that Iˆ ′′(v) = 0. The argument from the above paragraph then applies to establish that the
global maximum is again achieved either at the unique local maximum at µs(y) =
1
2
(1 − λ
ξ
) or
at the boundary µs(y) = 0 or, by symmetry, µs(y) = 1− λξ .
Substituting µs(y) =
1
2
(1− λ
ξ
) into (A.18), we obtain 1
2
[(1− λ
ξ
) log(1− λ
ξ
)+(1+ λ
ξ
) log(1+ λ
ξ
)],
which is precisely the mutual information of the truthful equilibrium; substituting µs(y) = 0 or
µs(y) = 1− λξ into (A.18) and using 0 log 0 = 0, we obtain 1 + 12 [( ξλ −1) log(1− λξ ) + log λξ ], which
is precisely the mutual information of the informative equilibrium in the deterministic response,
which can be replicated in the randomized response. The result follows from the fact that c < d,
where c ≈ 0.743 is the critical value in Lemma 2.
42
Appendix B – Experimental Instructions
B.1 Instructions (RandomLow)
INSTRUCTION
Welcome to the experiment. This experiment studies decision making between two individ-
uals. In the following two hours or less, you will participate in 40 rounds of decision making.
Please read the instructions below carefully; the cash payment you will receive at the end of the
experiment depends on how well you make your decisions according to these instructions.
Your Role and Decision Group
Half of the participants will be randomly assigned the role of Member A and the other half
the role of Member B. Your role will remain fixed throughout the experiment. In each round,
one Member A will be paired with one Member B to form a group of two. The two members
in a group make decisions that will affect their rewards in the round. Participants will be
randomly rematched after each round to form new groups.
Your Decision in Each Round
In each round and for each group, the computer will randomly select, with equal chance,
either SQUARE or TRIANGLE. The selected shape will be revealed to Member A. Indepen-
dently, the computer will also randomly select one of the following two questions for Member A:
“Was SQUARE selected?” or “Was TRIANGLE selected?” The chance that “WAS SQUARE se-
lected?” will be drawn is 40%, and the chance that “Was TRIANGLE selected?” will be drawn is
60%. Note that the two pieces of information—which shape and which question are selected—is
only known to Member A; Member B is not provided with such information.
Member A’s Decision
At the beginning of each round, the selected shape and question will be shown on your screen.
You respond to the selected question by clicking either “Yes” or “No”, and your decision in the
round is completed. You are free to choose your response; it is not part of the instructions that
you have to respond to indicate the actual shape selected.
Once you click the button, your response will be shown on the screen of the Member B that
you are paired with in the round. Be reminded again that he/she will only see your “Yes”/“No”
response and will not know which question you are responding to nor which shape was selected.
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Member B’s Decision
Based on the “Yes”/“No” response of Member A, you will be asked to predict the shape that
was selected by the computer. You state your prediction in percentage terms, similar to how
rain forecasts are typically reported, i.e., there is an X% chance of rain (so with (100 − X)%
chance there will be no rain). You will be rewarded according to the accuracy of your prediction.
In each round, you will be presented with a Yellow Box that contains 100 shapes. You will be
asked to decide how many shapes are SQUARES and how many are TRIANGLES. The numbers
of SQUARES and TRIANGLES in the Yellow Box represent your prediction. For example, if
the number of SQUARES is 70 (so the number of TRIANGLES is 30), it means that you predict
that there is a 70% (30%) chance that the computer has selected SQUARE (TRIANGLE). You
input your prediction by clicking on a line with a green ball on it that lies inside the Yellow Box.
The left end of the line represents 0 SQUARES and 100 TRIANGLES; the right end represents
100 SQUARES and 0 TRIANGLES. You can choose any integer point in between. When you
click on the line, the green ball will move to the point you click on, and the corresponding
numbers of SQUARES and TRIANGLES will be shown inside  and 4 in the Yellow Box.
You adjust your click until you arrive at your desired numbers, after which you click the
submit button. Your decision in the round is then completed. (You still have to perform some
manual task to have your reward in the round determined. More information will provided
below.)
Your Reward in Each Round
Your reward in the experiment will be expressed in terms of experimental currency unit
(ECU). The following describes how your reward in each round is determined.
Member A’s Reward
The amount of ECU you earn in a round depends on two factors. The first is whether your
“Yes”/“No” response to the selected question indicates which shape was actually selected by the
computer. If it does, you will receive 300 ECU; if it does not, you will receive 250 ECU.
The second factor is Member B’s prediction of the chance that SQUARE was selected. The
amount of ECU you earn from responding to the question (either 300 or 250) will be reduced by
twice the number of SQUARES in Member B’s Yellow Box.
Here is an example of two different scenarios in which your earnings will both be 160 ECU:
1. The computer selected SQUARE and “Was TRIANGLE selected?” You responded “No”.
Since your response indicates which shape was actually selected, you receive 300 ECU for
the first part. If Member B predicts a 70% chance of SQUARE by having 70 SQUARES
in the Yellow Box, your earning in the round will be 300− (2× 70) = 160 ECU.
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2. The computer selected TRIANGLE and “Was SQUARE selected?” You responded “Yes”.
Since your response does not indicate which shape was actually selected, you receive 250
ECU for the first part. If Member B predicts a 45% chance of SQUARE by having 45
SQUARES in the Yellow Box, your earning in the round will be 250− (2×45) = 160 ECU.
Member B’s Reward
The amount of ECU you earn in a round, either 300 ECU or 50 ECU, is determined by
the procedure described below. The reward procedure provides incentives to you to state your
prediction according to what you truly believe is the chance that SQUARE/TRIANGLE was
selected: your earning in expected terms will be highest if you state your true belief.
You will be presented with another box, a Green Box, that helps determine your earning.
The Green Box also contains 100 shapes. At the beginning of each round, a number is randomly
drawn with equal chance from 1 to 100 to determine the number of SQUARES in the Green
Box (100 minus the number drawn is the number of TRIANGLES). Since this happens at the
beginning of the round, it is not influenced by any decision made during the round. It is
also independent of the shape and question that are selected for Member A. The numbers of
SQUARES and TRIANGLES in the Green Box will be revealed to you only after you submit
the numbers for the Yellow Box. Your earning in the round will be determined as follows:
1. If the number of SQUARES in the Yellow Box is larger than or equal to the numbers of
SQUARE in the Green Box, your earning will depend on which shape was selected and
revealed to Member A at the beginning of the round:
(a) If it was SQUARE, you will receive 300 ECU.
(b) If it was TRIANGLE, you will receive 50 ECU.
2. If the number of SQUARES in the Yellow Box is smaller than the numbers of SQUARE
in the Green Box, you will randomly draw a shape from the Green Box:
(a) If the randomly drawn shape is a SQUARE, you will receive 300 ECU.
(b) If the randomly drawn shape is a TRIANGLE, you will receive 50 ECU.
Information Feedback
At the end of each round, the computer will provide a summary for the round: which shape
and question were selected and revealed to Member A, Member A’s response, the number of
SQUARES in Member B’s Yellow Box, and your earning in ECU.
Your Cash Payment
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The experimenter randomly selects 3 rounds out of 40 to calculate your cash payment. (So
it is in your best interest to take each round seriously.) Your total cash payment at the end of
the experiment will be the average amount of ECU you earned in the 3 selected rounds divided
by 10 (i.e., 10 ECU = 1 USD) plus a $5 show-up fee.
Quiz and Practice
To ensure your understanding of the instructions, we will provide you with a quiz and practice
rounds. We will go through the quiz after you answer it on your own. You will then participate
in 6 practice rounds, where you will have a chance to play both Member A (3 rounds) and
Member B (3 rounds). The practice rounds are part of the instructions which are not relevant
to your cash payment; its objective is to get you familiar with the computer interface and the
flow of the decisions in each round.
Once the practice rounds are over, the computer will tell you “The official rounds begin now!”
You will be randomly assigned the role of either Member A or Member B, which will not change
during the 40 official rounds.
Adminstration
Your decisions as well as your monetary payment will be kept confidential. Remember that
you have to make your decisions entirely on your own; please do not discuss your decisions with
any other participants.
Upon finishing the experiment, you will receive your cash payment. You will be asked to sign
your name to acknowledge your receipt of the payment (which will not be used for tax purposes).
You are then free to leave.
If you have any question, please raise your hand now. We will answer your question individ-
ually. If there is no question, we will proceed to the quiz.
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B.2 z-Tree Screen Shots
Training round: The first screen of the sender subject.Figur 5: Memb r A’s Response Scre n
Figure 6: Member B’s Prediction Screen
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The number of SQUARES in the GREEN BOX is revealed. In this example, the 
YELLOW BOX has more SQUARES than the GREEN BOX. So, the reward will be 
determined by the actual shape Pressing the button “ACTUAL SHAPE” shows        .             
the selected shape in the next screen.
Figure 7: Member B’s Reward Screen
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